From Tranquility to Insight

 

A History of The Satipatthana Sutta

Bhikkhu Sujata

INTRODUCTION 

‘Mindfulness is useful everywhere’; so said the Buddha. And in harmony with this motif, the theme of mindfulness echoes throughout each of the melodies that compose the path to freedom. At its most fundamental, mindfulness is essential for the sense of conscience on which ethical conduct is founded; hence alcohol and drugs, destroying mindfulness, engender uncountable harm and suffering to humanity. Mindfulness, in its older sense of ‘memory’, remembers and recollects the teachings, forming the basis for the intellectual comprehension of the Dhamma, and bears them in mind, ready to apply right at the crucial moment. Mindfulness guards the senses, endowing the meditator with circumspection, dignity, and collectedness, not allowing the senses to play at will with the tantalizing toys and baubles of the world. Mindfulness repeatedly re-collects awareness into the present, re-membering oneself so that one’s actions are purposeful and appropriate, grounded in time and place. Mindfulness is prominent in all approaches to meditation, and in refined form it distinguishes the exalted levels of higher consciousness called samadhi. On the plane of wisdom, mindfulness extends the continuity of awareness from ordinary consciousness to samadhi and beyond, staying with the mind in all of its permutations and transformations and thus supplying the fuel for understanding impermanence and causality. And finally on the plane of liberation, perfected mindfulness is an inalienable quality of the realized sage, who lives ‘ever mindful’.

 

Given this ubiquity of mindfulness, as omnipresent as salt in the ocean, it would seem a hopeless task to isolate certain areas of the Dhamma as bearing a special affinity with mindfulness. Indeed, we might even go further and allege that any such attempt conceals a program to co-opt the unique prestige of mindfulness in the cause of one’s own partisan perspective. Nevertheless, it has become a commonplace in 20^th Century Theravada meditation circles that mindfulness, and in particular its chief manifestation as satipatthana, is close or identical in meaning with vipassana, or insight. In this work I wish to suggest a very different idea – that in the early teachings satipatthana was primarily associated with samadhi.

 

In an earlier work (A Swift Pair of Messengers),[1] I discussed at some length the treatment of satipatthana as found in the early suttas, focusing on the teaching sections of the Satipatthana Sutta. My goal was to demonstrate that satipatthana, far from being a distinctive or separate mode of development, was embedded both deeply and broadly in the meaning-matrix of the early suttas and could neither be understood nor practiced outside of this context. Nearing the end of that project I came across an article by Richard Gombrich, president of the Pali Text Society, entitled ‘Retracing an Ancient Debate: How Insight Worsted Concentration in the Pali Canon’.[2] Although I was only partially convinced by his arguments, I was intrigued by his idea – that the shift in emphasis from samadhi to vipassana, so obvious in later Theravada, could be traced back to editorial changes made within the period of compilation of the Pali Nikayas. It jolted some memories of a few loose ends I had noticed in my study of satipatthana. I decided to tug on those strands of thought, and to my amazement the whole Satipatthana Sutta started to unravel before my eyes. This is the story of how the Satipatthana Sutta was woven, how it unravels, and what the meaning of this is for our understanding of Dhamma-Vinaya.

 

The key to my approach is to analyze the various strata of texts on satipatthana in terms of samatha and vipassana. I should therefore start by explaining what I mean by these; since I have already treated this matter at length in A Swift Pair of Messengers, here I will summarize. The suttas never classify the various meditation themes into either samatha or vipassana. They are not two different kinds of meditation; rather, they are qualities of the mind that should be developed. Broadly speaking, samatha refers to the emotional aspects of our minds, the heart qualities such as peace, compassion, love, bliss. Vipassana refers to the wisdom qualities such as understanding, discrimination, discernment. Samatha soothes the emotional defilements such as greed and anger, while vipassana pierces with understanding the darkness of delusion. It is apparent that all meditation requires both of these qualities, so in seeking to disentangle them we must inevitably remain in the twilight zone of emphasis and perspective, eschewing the easy clarity of black-&-white absolutes. While vipassana, then, at its broadest plays its role in all aspects of our spiritual life, for my current purposes I wish to define it more narrowly: the meditative discernment of the nature of conditioned reality as impermanent, suffering, and not-self. This is, if you like, a ‘hard-core’ definition. While this is probably too narrow for some of the uses in the suttas and later literature, still vipassana is used in this sense sometimes in the suttas, and commonly in the present day.

 

My treatment will be strictly historical. I am far from pretending that this is the one and only way; and yet it is surely in tune with the basic principles of vipassana to view the teachings as evolving in response to conditions. The significance of this approach is still largely unrecognized among practicing Buddhists. In fact, our normal approach to the teachings is the very opposite of historical. We learn meditation from a teacher whose words as they utter them must be the very latest formulation of the topic. Then we might go back to read some of the works of well-known 20^th century teachers. Since we usually have faith that these teachers were enlightened, we unconsciously assume that their teachings must be in accord with the suttas. Finally, if we are really dedicated, we may go back to read the Satipatthana Sutta. The other suttas on satipatthana, being so much shorter, are usually ignored under the presumption that they add little new. Even the best of the scholars who have studied satipatthana from a historical perspective, such as Warder and Gethin, have treated the Satipatthana Sutta as primary and the shorter suttas as supplements.

 

So now I would like to reverse that procedure. A basic principle of the historical method is to assume that simpler teachings are earlier and hence likely to be more authentic – we must start with the bricks before we can build a house. It is the shorter, more basic, suttas that are the most fundamental presentation of satipatthana. The longer suttas are an elaboration. This stratification, it should be noted, does not claim to be able to decide which teachings were genuinely spoken by the Buddha. He himself would obviously have given the same teachings initially in simple form, then later expanded on various details. But the universal testimony of the traditions is that the texts as we have them today were assembled in their present form after the Buddha’s passing away; so the rational approach is to assume that the texts were the outcome of an evolutionary process.

 

The method employed in this work incorporates both vertical and horizontal dimensions. In the vertical dimension the various strata of materials relating to satipatthana are displayed according to their historical provenance. The attempt is made to identify pre-Buddhist precursors of satipatthana. Within the Pali canon texts are stratified primarily on the basis of length. Later developments are explored and trends are identified. I am interested in threads of both continuity and discontinuity, so I ask both the questions ‘What is the same?’ and ‘What is different?’

 

In the horizontal dimension texts are considered in relation to the contemporary context. In the Nikayas/Agamas in particular it is obvious that no one text pretends to present an all-encompassing, definitive exposition, so each text must be considered in relation to the collection as a whole. In such a repetitive genre, the frequency of occurrence indicates the importance a text or teaching had to the redactors of the canon. In addition, full weight must be granted to the comparative study of the various traditions. While the Theravada Nikayas will forever remain our primary source for exploration of pre-sectarian Buddhism, the Agamas of the contemporary Sarvastivada, Dharmaguptaka, Mahasanghika, and other schools, which are preserved in ancient translations in the Chinese canon, provide an essential and underutilized check on the Pali. As the Encyclopedia of Buddhism puts it: ‘In our days it is impossible for any scholar to refer to early Buddhism unless he pays due regard to the comparative study of the southern and northern traditions.’ I would be gratified if this survey could at least demonstrate that the early Nikayas are not a mined-out field whose treasures are all safely housed in the later compendiums.

 

Each of the criteria employed in historical criticism is a highly imperfect tool when taken individually. But they are synergistic: where several criteria agree, the concurrence multiplies our confidence in our conclusions – the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. So in these studies it is imperative to use as wide a variety of criteria as possible, sensitively appraise the reliability of each criterion in the relevant context, remain alive to any contrary indications, and make our conclusions no more certain than the evidence warrants.

 

My basic conclusions from examining the discourses on satipatthana historically are these. Such evidence as may be adduced tends to confirm that, in the earliest strata of the suttas, satipatthana was primarily samatha. Since for the suttas samatha and vipassana cannot be divided, a few suttas show how this samatha practice would relate to vipassana.  In later literature the vipassana element grew to predominate, to the extent of almost entirely usurping the place of samatha in satipatthana.

 

I am well aware that these conclusions fly in the face of virtually every interpreter of satipatthana. Such an accumulated weight of authority cannot be discarded frivolously. At the risk of appearing pedantic and perhaps obsessive, I must proceed very carefully. I will therefore attempt to make my coverage as comprehensive as reasonably possible, casting an eye at every available important early text on satipatthana, as well as a range of later passages. I consciously flirt with the danger of polemicism, of simply asserting one extreme in reaction to an original extreme. In my defense I might suggest that everyone, no matter how ‘objective’ or ‘scientific’, has their own agenda, and that it is more honest to be open with one’s perspectives rather than to pretend – to others or to oneself – that one has no bias. My concern here is not so much for balance within this particular work, but for balance within the tradition as a whole.

 

The translations are from various sources. I am dependent on other translators largely in the Sanskrit and wholly in the Chinese. I have endeavored to maintain consistency of renderings of technical terms. Since the Pali canon is the backbone of this work I have for clarity’s sake rendered almost all Indian words in their Pali rather than Sanskrit form; the exceptions are for terms which are unknown in Pali in the relevant meaning. Crucial technical terms such as samatha, vipassana, satipatthana, etc., are a normal part of contemporary Buddhist meditation vocabulary, so I treat them as Anglicized forms without diacritical marks.

 

Historical criticism is not nice. I am afraid this presentation may sometimes appear rather more surgical than inspirational. Relentless analysis can seem opposed to faith. But this need not be so. One who has true faith in the Dhamma would surely not fear that mere literary criticism can destroy the teachings. And is it not just fear that wishes to protect one’s sacred scriptures, to enshrine them on a pedestal, to lock them safely away in a gorgeous chest on one’s shrine, safe from any impious inquiry? Thankfully such fear, while certainly not absent, does not predominate in contemporary Buddhist circles. And our findings, no matter how cruelly we wield the scalpel, do not affect the fundamentals of our faith. There is a massive concurrence between the early sources of Buddhism as to the central teachings – not just the ideas and principles, but even the actual texts and formulations as well. The discrepancies we shall notice in our explorations undermine not these fundamentals, but certain implications and trends discernable in the arrangement and emphasis of the more developed formulations. Even here the differences, to begin with, are slight and few in number. So it is my intention, not to raise doubts, but to encourage the maturing of faith.

 

 

 

PREVIOUS STUDIES

 

There have been a number of authors who have studied and commented on the various versions of the Satipatthana Sutta. I have learned something from each of these writers, so I may as well begin by surveying those who have gone before. As I mentioned above, I was first alerted to the existence of Chinese versions of the sutta by A.K. Warder. He is summarizing, so after recording the major differences he merely notes in connection with the contemplation of dhammas that ‘the original text simply opposed these good principles [enlightenment-factors] to the obstacles.’[3]

 

Thich Nath Hahn published full translations of all three major versions of the Satipatthana Sutta in his Transformation and Healing. The translations, by him and Annabel Laity, offer an invaluable and almost unique opportunity to compare in English a major sutta in recensions from three different schools. However the translations sometimes bend too far to accommodate the translators’ ideas. Some comments on the texts are included, but the main orientation of the book is practical, so he does not pursue textual questions in great depth. The most relevant passage in our current context is this.

 

‘Other differences in the second version [Sarvastivada] are teachings on the kind of concentration which gives birth to joy and happiness, which is equivalent to the first jhana, and a concentration which abandons joy but maintains happiness, which is equivalent to the second jhana, as well as meditations on purity, clear light, and signs. All this is evidence that the practice of the Four Jhanas had already begun to infiltrate the sutra pitaka, although discretely. By the time of the third version [Mahasanghika], the practice of the jhanas is mentioned quite openly, by name. The meditation which observes the pure light can be seen as announcing the first steps in the formation of Pure Land Buddhism, and the meditation on the sign will be developed in the use of the kasina, a symbolic image visualized as a point of concentration.’

 

Apparently Thich Nath Hahn believes that the jhanas were a later infiltration into Buddhism; this would entail that all of the hundreds of suttas mentioning jhanas in the Pali canon were composed later than the current text. He offers no evidence for this extraordinary view. His comments here almost all miss the point, simply because he assumes that the current text, the Sarvastivada Smrityupasthana Sutra, is the original source of these various practices. However they are all found elsewhere in the Pali canon, and the current text is obviously a somewhat later compilation. His association of the perception of light with Pure Land is far-fetched. The perception of light is standard remedy for sloth & torpor, and surely the origins of Pure Land should be sought rather among the devotional passages in the early suttas. Again, the statement on the ‘sign’ misses the point, for he apparently is unaware that the practice described is not visualization but reviewing of jhana. Thus, however beneficial Thich Nath Hahn’s practical advice may be, his textual analysis is not very useful for a historical inquiry.

 

Thanissaro Bhikkhu discusses the issues briefly in The Wings to Awakening.[4] He renders ‘dhammas’ in satipatthana as ‘mental qualities’ rather than ‘phenomena’, since he believes that the various groups of dhammas are chiefly variations on the abandoning of the hindrances and the development of the enlightenment-factors. He mentions the Vibhanga and the Sarvastivada version as historical support for this argument. However he retains a typically reserved attitude towards the possibility of reconstructing a projected original text. While it is certainly true that the main factors in the fourth satipatthana are mental qualities, other aspects of satipatthana are also mental qualities, such as feelings, so this does not serve to adequately distinguish the meaning here. Below I will suggest that the most significant difference between the fourth satipatthana and the rest is that it treats of causality, so if I were to translate dhammas here I would use ‘principles’.

 

Bhiksu Thich Minh Chau furnishes details of the Sarvastivada Smrityupasthana Sutra in his invaluable work The Chinese Madhyama Agama and the Pali Majjhima Nikaya.[5]  He points out that satipatthana is the only group of the 37 wings to enlightenment to exhibit any noteworthy variation between the Sarvastivada and Theravada. But he overlooks the importance of the differences when he remarks: ‘Both versions offer almost the same materials, as the basic approach to the contemplations is identical.’ It therefore seems necessary to modify his conclusion that: ‘both versions were derived from the same source but the selection of details was left to the compilers more or less freely.’ As Bhiksu Thich Minh Chau has well demonstrated in several other places, the differences in arrangement are not ‘free’, but reflect the emerging doctrinal divergences between the two schools.

 

R.M.L. Gethin in his The Buddhist Path to Awakening,[6] notes some of the divergences between the various versions of the Satipatthana Sutta, and says that:

 

‘This has led some scholars, such as Schmithausen and Bronkhorst, to speculate on the nature of the “original” specification of the first and fourth satipatthanas: the former suggests that watching the body originally consisted only of watching the postures of the body, and the latter (following the Vibhanga) suggests that it consisted only of watching the different parts of the body. Much of their discussion is at best highly speculative, and at worst misconceived.

 

‘Schmithausen, for example, suggests that the redactors of the Pali canon have put the watching of breath first because in some canonical texts, such as the Anapanasati Sutta, it is presented as the preliminary stage of the four satipatthanas. This is a misunderstanding. As we have seen, in the Anapanasati Sutta watching the breathing is not a preliminary of the satipatthanas, it actually is the satipatthanas.’[7]

 

Unfortunately the studies by Schmithausen and Bronkhorst are not available to me, so I am not sure to what extent my work is merely re-plowing such barren fields of speculation. The idea that the contemplation of the postures was the original exercise in body contemplation was perhaps derived from the fact that this is the only one of the body contemplation exercises that is regularly mentioned in the gradual training. There, however, it is not subsumed under the four satipatthanas, and in fact the Satipatthana Sutta is perhaps the only place where it is thus subsumed. As we shall see, the second suggestion – that body contemplation originally was just the parts of the body – is supported by much more than just the Vibhanga; but even with this reinforced evidence it would be going too far to declare that this alone constituted body contemplation. As for the relation between anapanasati and satipatthana, Gethin’s observation is certainly correct; but Schmithausen’s error is understandable, for he may have been influenced by Sarvastivadin texts such as the Abhidharmakosa, which do indeed treat anapanasati as a preliminary to satipatthana.

 

Thus, so far as I am aware, of the scholars who have commented on the variations in the various versions of the Satipatthana Sutta, none have examined the matter in great detail and depth, and none have drawn any particularly significant or persuasive conclusions.

 

 

 

PRE-BUDDHIST MEDITATION

 

Sati in the suttas is functionally described in terms of either sara ‘memory’, or anupassana ‘observation’. The relation between these two ideas is, to our mind, strange, and attempts at explanation have, I believe, been mistaken in giving a psychological explanation for what is a historical, linguistic development. Sara is from the same root as sati, and is obviously the historical meaning. Sati came to mean, in the Brahmanical tradition generally, ‘received tradition, memorized texts.’ This meaning is attested in the suttas, where it is treated identically in Buddhist and Brahmanical contexts.

 

Sati is apparently used since the Rig Veda (perhaps a thousand years before the Buddha) in two senses: to ‘remember’ or ‘recollect’, and to ‘bear in mind’. The significance of this should not be overlooked. Sati is not merely a word one uses to refer to some texts one remembers; it is highly probable that the development of the culture of memorizing texts lead to the discovery, investigation, and development of what ‘memory’ is. That is to say, those who memorized the Vedic mantras were engaged in an early form of mental culture, a mental culture where ‘memory’ was a vital quality. While it is impossible to document this in detail, it again seems very likely that this form of mental culture was one of the strands that was woven into what we know as ‘meditation’.

 

Even today we use the 4000 year old Vedic word ‘mantra’, which originally referred to the Vedic texts, as a term for a meditation word, a sound or phrase traditionally taken from the ancient texts that one repeats over and again as a support for meditation. In the suttas, the Buddha is asked by a Brahman why the mantras (here = Vedas) are sometimes easy to remember and sometimes not.[8] Typically, he answers that when the five hindrances are present the mantras are not clear; when the five hindrances are absent the mantras are clear. This is a straightforward example of how the science of memorizing texts would lead naturally to investigation of the mental qualities necessary for success in such an ambitious venture. The relation between recollection and meditation is still strong today in Buddhism. For example, most Buddhists are familiar with the basic passages for ‘recollection’ (anussati) of the Triple Gem. These form the basis for both the regular chanting at Buddhist ceremonies, and also the meditation on the Triple Gem.

 

In a similar fashion, the verses of the Vedas had a highly numinous, mystical significance for the ancient Brahman priests, and it would have been natural for the more contemplative among them to induce exalted states of consciousness through the ecstatic recollection of the sacred words. In order to memorize long texts it is, of course, necessary to repeat passages over and over again. If one does this mechanically, without interest, the memorizing will not succeed. One must bring inspiration, joy, attention, and understanding to the task. One must learn to ‘stay with’ the present moment – and here we are crossing over to the familiar Buddhist idea of ‘mindfulness’.

 

Investigation of pre-Buddhist meditation terminology is hampered by the fact that the Vedas have little or nothing on meditation and even the early Upanishads have nothing clear. The earliest clear descriptions of meditation outside of Buddhism are in later texts of the Upanishads and the Jains. These are later than the suttas, so it is likely there is Buddhist influence. However, there is no reason why even late texts should not preserve old traditions, too.

 

There has in recent years been doubt thrown on the accepted wisdom that the early Upanishads were pre-Buddhist. I incline to think that the texts we have today, even the Brihadaranyaka, were edited after the suttas. But whether or not the Upanishads in their current form existed at the Buddha’s time, there is no doubt that ideas we can call ‘Upanishadic’ were prominent. In the sphere of metaphysics we can cite the Buddha’s critique of such ideas as that the self is infinite (anantava atta), or that the self is identical with the world (so atta so loko), or that ‘I am He’ (eso’hamasmi). It would seem only natural to connect such metaphysics with samadhi attainments, as implied by the Brahmajala Sutta. In fact, it is possible that the very title of that sutta is relevant – the Net for catching Brahma.

 

It is necessary to proceed with caution here. The early Upanishads, especially the Brihadaranyaka, usually regarded as the earliest and most important, are a very mixed bag. The Brihadaranyaka includes passages of lyrical beauty, sophisticated philosophy, exalted metaphysics, and witty dialogue. It is closely concerned with ideas like the mind, the breath, and oneness, which are suggestive of a meditative culture. It distinguishes between mere perception (sanna) and liberating understanding (panna), and emphasizes the crucial role of cognition (vinnana) as contrasted with the more dynamic conceptual and emotive aspects of mind (mano). Therefore it insists on the necessity for personal experience rather than just book-learning. It frequently upsets preconceptions – women have strong supporting roles, and sometimes Brahmans are depicted as having to learn about Brahma from the Ksatriyas. (Even more remarkably, in the Chandyoga Upanishad there is a satire depicting Brahmanic priests as dogs, reminiscent of an uncharacteristically scathing satire in the Anguttara.[9]) But the Brihadaranyaka also retains much that is banal and even brutal. It endorses the sacrifice. It is unabashedly materialistic. It is full of sophistical thaumaturgy and hocus-pocus. It contains black magic – a curse to place on one’s rival in love. It includes the crudest imaginable sex magic. If one’s woman is reluctant to participate she should first be bribed with presents; ‘and if she still does not grant him his desire, he should beat her with a stick or his hand and overcome her’.[10] (Those who like to imagine that ‘tantric’ practices were a feminizing influence in andocentric Indian spiritual culture please take note.) It hardly needs saying that such ideas are totally incompatible with any genuine mind culture. The text is a testament to the diversity of ideas that the ancient Brahmans could regard as ‘spiritual’, and to the elasticity of the compilers of the text we have today. Let us look at some of the passages most suggestive of meditation.

 

‘Therefore let a man perform one observance only, let him breath up and let him breath down, that the evil death might not reach him.’ [11]

 

‘The unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unthought thinker, the uncognized cognizer… There is no other seer but he, no other hearer, no other thinker, no other cognizer. This is thy self, the inner controller, the immortal…’ [12]

 

‘Therefore, knowing this, being calm, tamed, quiet, enduring, concentrated, one sees the soul in oneself.’ [13]

 

By themselves such passages are too vague to reach any clear conclusion regarding meditative practices. And even the last passage, which is the most suggestive, has ‘faithful’ as a variant reading for ‘concentrated’. For clear teachings on meditation we must go forward to the Svetasvatara Upanishad.

 

‘By making his body the under-wood and the syllable “om” the upper-wood, man, after repeating the drill of meditation, will perceive the bright god, like the spark hidden in the wood.’ [14]

 

‘If the wise man holds his body with the three upright parts even, and turns his senses with his mind towards the heart, he will then in the boat of brahman cross over all the fearful streams.’[15]

 

‘Compressing his breath, let him, who has subdued all motions, breath forth through the nose with gentle breath. Let the wise one, being heedful, keep hold of his mind, that chariot yoked with wild horses.’ [16]

 

‘When yoga is being performed, the forms that come first, producing apparitions in Brahman, are those of misty smoke, sun, fire, wind, fire-flies, lightnings, and a crystal moon.’ [17]

 

These are fairly straightforward references to meditation, and they will not sound unfamiliar to anyone versed in Buddhist meditation. The simile of meditation like two fire-sticks is well-known in the suttas.[18] Notice the close connection in SU 2.9 between ‘heedfulness’ (appamada) and ‘keeping hold’ (dharana), a term semantically equivalent to sati. It seems that the earliest Brahmanical meditation subjects were the contemplation of the mystical syllable ‘om’ and the breath. Of course, the ‘breath’ and the ‘word’ are closely related and are mystically identified in the Upanishads; in practice, the yogis may have recited ‘om’ together with the breath. The Upanishads have many passages that assert the supremacy of the breath over the sense faculties and mind (‘mind’ here meaning thoughts and emotions). These can be understood as an allegorical description of the evolution of awareness from the diversity of externals towards a unity with the breath.

 

The breath is the prime exercise in satipatthana body contemplation. And other aspects suggestive of satipatthana can be discerned in the Upanishadic tradition, too. Just as in the suttas, the interdependence of the breath (body) and food is stressed.[19] The elements are of course universal throughout the ancient world, and were commonly worshipped as deities. For example Agni (Fire) was a major deity in the Vedas, and undoubtedly inspired ecstatic contemplation. The Earth (Mother), whose symbols pervade the iconography of Buddhism, was also widely revered, and seems to be associated with the Indus Valley religion, which preserves the oldest known images of yogis. The parts of the body are worshipped in the Chandyoga Upanishad: hair, skin, flesh, bone, marrow.[20] All of these appear in the sutta list of body parts, and in the same order. Charnel grounds, too, have long been a favorite haunting ground of a certain type of ascetic.

 

The other satipatthanas – feelings, mind, and dhammas – seem to correspond with the famous Brahmanical threesome: mind, being, bliss (cit, sat, ananda). Mind and bliss are obvious enough. As for being, this is a fundamental philosophical term for the Upanishads, just as dhamma is the fundamental term for Buddhism. The dhamma theory was clearly developed to provide an explanation for phenomenal reality opposed to the Brahmanical conception of an absolute underlying ground of being. And indeed we find that the contemplation of dhammas prominently features the same term for being, sat, that was so important for the Brahmans; yet here it is treated, as always in the suttas, in a thoroughly empirical, anti-metaphysical way: the ‘presence’ or ‘absence’ of good or bad mental factors according to conditions.

 

We shall see towards the end of this study that some of the later Buddhist theorists posited a relationship between the evolution of the stages of understanding in meditation and the stages of understanding of the various schools. It is perhaps not so far-fetched to see a similar progress here. In fact we can analyze the stages of Indian religion in terms of the four satipatthanas. The earliest stages in Indian religion were wholly physical – rituals, chants, the breath, sacrifices – pursued with the goal of fertility and prosperity. This developed into the practice of self-torment, which while still physical was predicated on the ability to endure painful feelings. The next stage was the emphasis on refined states of consciousness identified as the cosmic self. Finally the Buddhist critique, the analysis of dhammas in terms of conditionality and not-self.

 

Thus some of the various facets of satipatthana seem to have their precedents in the Brahmanical traditions. The difference, as so often, is firstly what is left out (hocus-pocus, rituals, deity worship, metaphysics, etc.), and secondly the manner of treatment. The practice is cool, rational, and sensible. The terminology has been thoroughly subsumed into the Buddhist system. Like the jhanas, etc., the presentation is purely in terms of clearly discernable empirical phenomena without any metaphysical overtones. It is not trying to persuade you of a theory but to point you towards your own experience.

 

Given the surprising lack of explicit references to meditation in any pre-Buddhist literature we are thrown back on the material in the Pali canon itself as our earliest source. There are a number of problems with this. The compilers of the suttas may not have had a very good knowledge of non-Buddhist practices, and may have succumbed to the temptation to put their opposition in a bad light. In addition, they quite likely described the practices of other schools in terminology they were familiar with, but which was not authentic to the other schools. Nevertheless, we find both the Buddhist and the non-Buddhist sources agreeing in broad terms in their description of pre-Buddhist meditation. There seem to be two such streams, represented by the two styles of practice undertaken by the Bodhisatta before his enlightenment. These streams are primarily represented by the samadhi practitioners of the Upanishads and the self-tormenters of the Jains.

 

The best known passage referring to such ‘Upanishadic’ yogis is the story of the Bodhisatta’s apprenticeship under Alara Kalama and Uddaka Ramaputta.[21] The Ariyapariyesana Sutta mentions three stages of this apprenticeship. Firstly, learning and lip-reciting of the texts. This is a hint that these are ascetics in the mainstream Vedic tradition; the nature of the texts is not specified here, but elsewhere the Buddha recalls that Uddaka Ramaputta claimed to be a vedagu, a master of the Vedas.[22] Secondly the path, here described as faith, energy, mindfulness, samadhi, and wisdom.[23] Thirdly, the goal – formless attainments. These three correspond with the classic threefold formulation of Buddhism – study, practice, and realization. The five factors of the path are the same as the Buddhist five spiritual faculties – a fact which is frequently overlooked by those who wish to interpret this passage as implying the ‘non-Buddhist’ nature of samadhi in general, or of formless attainments in particular. We cannot know how these qualities were understood in detail before the Buddha, but we could speculate that wisdom may have involved a mystical identification of the self with the world, to be fully realized at death. If it is true that the five spiritual faculties were genuinely associated with the Vedic/Upanishadic tradition, it may be no coincidence that it is in this context that we most frequently meet sati treated as ‘memory’.[24]

 

It must be noted that the Bodhisatta did not reject the formless attainments in & of themselves. It is definitely not the case that he practiced samadhi meditation but not mindfulness meditation. Rather, he practiced mindfulness meditation to get into samadhi. Samadhi is emphasized in this account because it was the highest, the most exalted quality acknowledged in those systems, and because of its sublime peacefulness it was mistakenly taken to be the final end of the spiritual path. The Bodhisatta became disillusioned with ‘that dhamma’, i.e. with the teaching taken as a whole, because it led only to rebirth in the formless realm, and was therefore ‘insufficient’ to reach the ‘excellent state of peace’, the ending of birth, aging, and death. This is in perfect accord with the main stream of the suttas. Elsewhere it is said that ordinary people attain samadhi (here the four jhanas[25] and the four divine abidings[26]), are reborn in the Brahma realms, and after a long period of bliss fall back into lower realms. But noble disciples, after reaching the Brahma realms, attain Nibbana from there.  The difference is not in the states of samadhi as such – these are just manifestations of the mind at peace. The difference is in the views and interpretations, the conceptual wrapping that one bundles the experience up in. The path must be taken as a whole. If one starts out with wrong view, one’s meditation experiences are likely to simply reinforce one’s preconceptions. If one practices samadhi with the view that one’s soul will become immersed in some exalted state of being, well, one will get what one wishes for.

 

This is the most important feature distinguishing this episode from the later occasion when the Bodhisatta recollected his experience of first jhana as a child, and realized that: ‘That indeed is the path to enlightenment’. As a child his mind was uncluttered with views. He had no metaphysical agenda. The peace of the mind was just the peace of the mind; and so he realized that although such states were not the final goal he had been yearning for, they were indeed the path. 

 

One of the most interesting sources for understanding the meditation practices of Brahman ascetics is the Parayana Vagga of the Sutta Nipata. This text, universally regarded as one of the earliest and most authentic texts in the Pali canon, consists of a series of questions and answers between the Buddha and a group of sixteen Brahman meditators. There are several connections between this text and the Upanishad-style traditions we have been considering. The list of Brahmanical texts given is substantially shorter than that in the Brihadaranyaka, suggesting that it is earlier. It has a satirical reference to an evil Brahman who threatens to ‘split heads’; the same threat occurs several times in the Brihadaranyaka, the difference being that there someone’s head actually does get split! The Buddha of course dismisses the efficacy of Vedic knowledge, ritual, sacrifice, and the idea of ‘self’. We meet again the phrase ‘seen, heard, thought, cognized’ that we have encountered in the Brihadaranyaka, and also frequent reference to the pairing of cognition with name & form, another Upanishadic idea.

 

The faith and devotion of these yogis is very moving, and stands in decided contrast with the sometimes strained relationship between the Buddha and the scholastic and ritualistic Brahmans. In this friendly atmosphere it seems likely that the Buddha would have, wherever possible, kept to his normal policy of encouraging his disciples to continue developing whatever spiritual practices were most inspiring and useful. The introductory verses, which are admittedly somewhat later, refer indirectly to the five spiritual faculties,[27] and say the sixteen Brahmans are practitioners of jhana.[28] The teachings are brief and non-technical, but there is recognizable reference to the fourth jhana[29] and to the sphere of nothingness.[30] And time and time again, the Buddha exhorts these yogis to be ‘ever mindful’. This confirms the association of mindfulness with Brahmanic culture; the Buddha would hardly have used the term so freely if he did not expect his audience to understand it.

 

There are three discourses in the Bojjhanga Samyutta that present the claims of non-Buddhist wanderers to develop Buddhist-style meditation. They say they exhort their disciples to abandon the five hindrances and to develop, in two cases, the seven enlightenment-factors,[31] and in a third case, the four divine abidings.[32] Elsewhere too the divine abidings are attributed to great sages of the past, notably the Buddha in past lives.[33] However, although these were indeed later appropriated by the Brahmanical tradition, they are not attested in any pre-Buddhist texts. The enlightenment-factors include mindfulness and investigation of dhammas, which is equivalent to vipassana, as well as samadhi. The wanderers ask, then, what is the difference between their teaching and the Buddha’s? Interestingly enough, the Buddha responds, not by referring to, say, the four noble truths, not-self, or dependent origination, but by claiming that the wanderers do not fully understand samadhi practice in all details. This is probably what the Buddha was referring to when he claimed elsewhere to have ‘awakened to jhana’ (jhanam abujjhi);[34] not that he was the first to practice jhana, but that he was the first to fully comprehend both the benefits and the limitations of such experiences.

 

The Brahamajala Sutta is the classic exposition of non-Buddhist meditation. It presents a bewildering array of 62 views, many of which were derived from or reinforced by the misinterpretation of samadhi experiences, including both form jhana and formless attainments. Yogis include both the mainstream Vedic/Upanishadic ‘Brahmans’ as well as the radical non-conformist ‘samanas’, of which the Buddha himself was one. Here, five terms typically describe the path into samadhi: ardency (atappa), striving (padhana), commitment (anuyoga), heedfulness (appamada), and right attention (samma manasikara). All these terms are common in Buddhist contexts; atappa occurs in the satipatthana formula. ‘Heedfulness’, which we encountered above in the Svetasvatara Upanishad, is close in meaning to ‘mindfulness’. ‘Attention’ is the basis for wisdom, and is closely associated with vipassana. So this appears like a surprising forerunner of the treatment of wisdom preceding samadhi.

 

But the suttas typically present the contemporary Brahmans as having fallen away from their glorious past. It is important to note this context: the suttas do not see the fact that pre-Buddhists practiced jhana as a reason for denigrating and sidelining samadhi practice, but as a feature by which they could praise the most sublime attainments of the sages of old, thus serving as an example for emulation and inspiration. The following verses were spoken by Venerable Maha Kaccana to some rude and abusive Brahman youths.

 

‘Those men of old who excelled in virtue

Those Brahmans who recalled the ancient rules

Their sense doors guarded, well protected

Dwelt having vanquished wrath within.

They took delight in Dhamma and jhana

Those Brahmans who recalled the ancient rules

 

‘But these having fallen, claiming “We recite.”

Puffed up by clan, faring unrighteously,

Overcome by anger, armed with diverse weapons,

They molest both frail and firm.

 

‘For one with sense doors unguarded

[All the vows he undertakes] are in vain.

Just like the wealth a man gains in a dream:

Fasting and sleeping on the ground,

Bathing at dawn, [study of] the three Vedas,

Rough hides, matted locks, and dirt,

Hymns, rules and vows, austerities,

Hypocrisy, bent staffs, ablutions:

These emblems of the Brahmans

Are used to increase their worldly gains.

 

‘A mind that is well concentrated,

Clear and free from blemish

Tender towards all living beings –

This is the path for attaining Brahma.’[35]

 

Understandably, the Brahman youths were not too pleased with this. So they went to their teacher, the Brahman Lohicca, and told him. Although he too was displeased, he reflected that he should not condemn on mere hearsay, so he visited Venerable Maha Kaccana to discuss the matter. He asked what the meaning of ‘sense doors guarded’ was.

 

‘Here, Brahman, having seen a visible form with the eye, one is not attracted to a pleasing visible form and not repelled by a displeasing visible form. One abides having established mindfulness of the body, with a measureless mind, and understands as it has become that heart-release, understanding-release, where those evil unskillful qualities cease without remainder….’

 

Here again we see the connection between pre-Buddhist meditation and mindfulness. The sequence – sense restraint, mindfulness, samadhi, understanding, release – allows Maha Kaccana to present the Buddhist ideal as the natural outcome and fulfillment of the practices of the Brahmans of old, so he can skillfully lead Lohicca on in a non-confrontational manner.

 

Since there are no contemporary records to provide us with a deeper look at these ideas, it seems we have no choice other than to take the risky path of comparing them with later texts. The Mahabharata clearly post-dates the Pali suttas. However, the events are set in a semi-mythical time before the Buddha, and there is no reason to suppose that it has not preserved some genuine old traditions. Here we find reference to the ‘fourfold jhanayoga’. Only the first, however, is described in detail:

 

‘The mind that is wandering about, with no support, with five gates, wobbling

The steadfast one should concentrate in the first jhana…’[36]

 

‘When the sage enters samadhi of the first jhana in the beginning,

Sustained application (vicara) and initial application (vitakka), and seclusion (viveka) arise in him…’ [37]

 

‘Conjoined with that bliss he will delight in the practice of jhana

Thus the yogis go to Nirvana that is free of disease…’[38]

 

There is obviously Buddhist influence here, at least in the terminology.

 

The Yoga Sutra speaks of a form of samadhi called samprajnata, which it describes as: ‘accompanied by initial application, sustained application, bliss (ananda), [the concept] “I am”, and form.’[39] This too seems identical with the Buddhist ‘form jhanas’. The addition of the idea ‘I am’ is obviously foreign to Buddhist thought, but is similar to the description of ‘Nibbana here & now’ in the Brahmajala Sutta:

 

‘When, sir, this self, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unskillful qualities, enters and abides in the first jhana, which has initial & sustained application, and the rapture & happiness born of seclusion, at that point the self attains Nibbana here & now…’ [40]

 

Since this passage is obviously criticizing self-theories, it is unlikely that the Yoga Sutra has introduced the idea ‘I am’ into the jhana formula from here; presumably it came from Upanishadic thought. The Yoga Sutra goes on to speak of another (higher) form of samadhi, which is called asamprajnata. This is described as ‘preceded by practice on the notion of cessation, and having just a residue of activities (samskarasesa)’[41] It is preceded by ‘faith, energy, mindfulness, samadhi, and wisdom’.[42] This samadhi, which precedes asamprajnata samadhi, is presumably the samprajnata samadhi, i.e. form jhana. The asamprajnata samadhi may therefore be plausibly identified with the Buddhist formless attainments, which are also preceded by form jhana, which are the outcome of a ‘gradual cessation of activities’, and the highest of which is called ‘an attainment with a residue of activities’[43]. It is very striking that the way of attaining this asamprajnata samadhi – the five spiritual faculties – is identical with the way of practice taught by Alara Kalama and Uddaka Ramaputta for attaining formless samadhi, and is also mentioned in the Parayana Vagga

 

It is also striking that many of these accounts state that the immediate precursor of samadhi is mindfulness. In contexts such as Patanjali’s Eightfold Yoga, which was obviously patterned after the Buddhist Eightfold Path, the factor immediately preceding jhana is dharana. Dharana, like sati, means ‘remembering, bearing in mind’, and in fact the Pali Abhidhamma quotes dharana as a synonym of sati. Above we noted the close relation of dharana with appamada, mirroring the close connection in the suttas between sati and appamada. So both the later yoga and the Buddhist tradition place ‘remembering/bearing in mind/mindfulness’ as the practice preceding jhana/samadhi. The Yoga Sutra treats sati in the usual sense of memory, and thus as a hindrance to meditation. Perhaps the brahmanical tradition had become accustomed to using sati in the sense of memory and thus generally preferred to use dharana in the sense of ‘keeping in mind’.

 

The above considerations lead me to tentatively conclude the following.

 

1)     There is a thread of Indian yogic tradition referred to in the Pali canon, which stems from the pre-Buddhist period, finds philosophical expression in the Upanishads, and in the later yoga texts is developed into a practical method using the sophisticated psychological terminology developed by the Buddhists.

2)     This tradition, through its commitment to memorizing ancient texts (sati = sara), gradually evolved an appreciation of the benefits of mindful awareness (sati = anupassana).

3)     In metaphysics these yogis emphasized the mystical union of the self with the cosmos.

4)     This metaphysic was preeminently realized in the practice of samadhi, especially formless attainments.

5)     The chief way to develop these formless attainments was to develop the five faculties, especially mindfulness and form jhana.

6)     The Buddha adopted the relevant practical aspects of this tradition into his teaching, his chief innovation being to not interpret samadhi experience in terms of a metaphysical ‘self’.

 

We turn now to the second thread of pre-Buddhist meditation. The classic description here is the account of the Bodhisatta’s austerities. His striving was most terrible: ‘crushing mind with mind’, doing the ‘breathless jhana’ until he felt as if his head was being pierced with a sword or crushed with a leather strap. But he could not make any progress. Why?

 

‘My energy was roused up and unflagging, my mindfulness was established and unconfused, but my body was afflicted and not tranquil because I was exhausted by the painful striving. But such painful feeling as arose in me did not invade my mind and remain.’[44]

 

Here, ‘mindfulness’ is obviously used in the sense of ‘present moment awareness’ rather than ‘memory’. The reason he struggled on with such grim self-torture is stated unambiguously:

 

‘I believed that pleasure was not to be gained through pleasure, but that pleasure was to be gained through pain.’[45]

 

This is wrong view. But having starved and tortured himself near to death because of that view, he reflected thus:

 

‘ “Whatever ascetics or Brahmans, past…future…and present experience painful, racking, piercing feelings due to exertion, this is the utmost, there is nothing beyond this. But by these racking austerities I have not attained any truly noble distinction of knowledge & vision beyond human principles. Could there be another path to enlightenment?”

 

‘I considered: “I recall that when my father the Sakyan was occupied, while I was sitting in the cool shade of a rose-apple tree, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unskillful qualities, I entered and abode in the first jhana, with initial & sustained application [of mind], and the rapture & happiness born of seclusion. Could that be the path to enlightenment?” Then, following on that memory came the awareness: “That indeed is the path to enlightenment.” 

 

‘I thought: “Why am I afraid of that pleasure that has nothing to do with sensual pleasures and unskillful qualities?” I thought: “I am not afraid of that pleasure, for it has nothing to do with sensual pleasures and unskillful qualities.” ’ [46]

 

He then decided that he could not attain jhana while so emaciated and must therefore take some food; the dependence of the mind on food, and hence the deleterious effects of fasting on one’s mind-state, is an Upanishadic idea.[47] Although the Bodhisatta never identifies himself in this period as following any teacher, his practices and views are identical with the Jains. And it is interesting to note that when the group of five ascetics abandoned him they went to stay in the ‘Rishi’s park’ in Benares, where even today there is still a Jain temple. Such ideas, however, were not exclusive to the Jains; they were a common heritage of the Indian yogic tradition, and are met with frequently in the early Brahmanical scriptures as well, as Maha Kaccana’s verses above indicate. In fact the Jains were, it seems, reformists to a degree, in that they rejected forms of asceticism that might harm living beings, and they also laid stress on the proper mental attitude. Earlier, more primitive, self-torturers had believed in the efficacy of the physical torture itself, irrespective of any mental development. Also, their goal was typically psychic powers, whereas the Jains aimed at liberation of the soul. Thus the Bodhisatta’s austerities do seem to be closer to the Jains than any other group we know of. The implication of this episode is that the Jain system emphasized effort and mindfulness, but not until the Bodhisatta developed the tranquility and bliss of samadhi was he able to see the truth. Does this agree with the Jain sources?  The earliest Jain sutras speak mainly of ethical practices, lifestyle, and basic principles, but do not explicitly mention meditation in any recognizable form. Slightly later we find the following:

 

‘Then having preserved his life, the remainder of his life being but a short period, he stops activities and enters dry jhana[48] in which only subtle activity remains and from which one does not fall back. He first stops the activity of mind, then of speech and of body, then he puts an end to breathing…’[49]

 

This is congruent with the descriptions of Jain-style meditation as described in the suttas, and therefore gives us confidence such descriptions preserve authentic traditions. Later texts refer to familiar ideas such as samadhi, one-pointedness, discriminating insight, reflection on impermanence (anicca), change (viparinama), and ugliness (asubha).[50] There are apparently references to mindfulness as part of the Jain path, but I do not know what period they belong to.

 

Conclusion

 

The early Buddhists were extraordinarily generous in their assessment of the spiritual attainments of outsiders. They were quite happy to attribute to them such central elements of the Buddhist meditation system as mindfulness, jhanas, spiritual faculties, enlightenment-factors, divine abidings, and formless attainments. We can discern aspects of both samatha and vipassana. Although it is impossible to fully untangle the threads of samatha and vipassana in these traditions, just as in the Buddhist traditions, it seems possible to discern a different emphasis in the meditative approaches of the different schools that correlates with their philosophical positions.

 

The Upanishadic tradition espouses a non-dual pantheism. Brahman is the ultimate reality, which creates the world, underlies the illusion of diversity, and is immanent in all existence. Thus existence is inherently good; we already partake of the divine essence, and our spiritual practices empower us to realize this identity fully. This tradition therefore naturally emphasizes meditation practices leading to blissful identification with the One; as later traditions summed it up: ‘mind, being, bliss.’

 

The Jains, on the other hand, have a wholly naturalistic and non-theistic view of existence. The world is not an illusion; it really exists ‘out there’, and the ultimate reality is not a pan-theistic non-dual ‘ground of being’, but is the countless irreducible atomic monads or ‘souls’. Later Jain theory developed this pluralistic approach into a vastly complex scheme for classifying the various elemental phenomena, an Aristotelian project that found favor amongst the abhidhamma schools of Buddhism, too. Enlightenment consists, not in the mystic identification of the self with the universe, but in the disentanglement of the individual soul from the polluting effects of kamma. They therefore emphasize, as part of their overall strategy of forcibly stopping all activity, contemplation of the impermanence of the world, and the ability to mindfully endure painful feelings in order to facilitate freedom from the defiling influences.

 

It would therefore seem that the Brahmanical tradition leaned to the side of samatha, while the Jain tradition leaned to the side of vipassana, each shaping its presentation and emphasis in accord with its metaphysical predilections. The evidence of the non-Buddhists themselves, as far as it goes, tends to confirm that the picture painted in the early suttas of the non-Buddhist traditions is generally accurate. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we can conclude that the earliest Buddhist traditions accept that both the Brahmanical and the Jain contemplative traditions included the practice of mindfulness. However, only the Brahmanical tradition cultivated tranquility leading to samadhi. Therefore the Buddha’s teaching was more closely modeled on the Brahmanical approach. 

 

I must restate the tentativeness of these conclusions. The real situation was terribly complex; there was no doubt much borrowing and interchange of ideas, and I have ignored such important issues as the tenuousness of any links between the Yoga and the Upanishads, and the philosophical similarities between the Sankhya/Yoga and the abhidhamma schools. In fact, it may be held that it is inappropriate to subject non-Buddhist traditions to a Buddhist analysis rather than simply presenting them on their own terms. In my defence, my aim here is to seek lines of continuity/discontinuity between the Buddhist and non-Buddhist traditions, and I am therefore compelled to try to see the other traditions from a Buddhist perspective. Rather than seeing this analysis as complete or even as a summary, it may be better to view it as a point of departure against which the real complexity of Indian spiritual culture can be reckoned.   

 

 

 

BASIC PASSAGES ON MINDFULNESS

 

Having conducted a brief overview of the meditative culture within which the Buddha taught, we can now proceed to consider the teachings on mindfulness in the suttas. The most fundamental teachings are the short phrases and passages commonly found throughout all sections of the early texts. We seek a basic perspective from which to view the more detailed and developed teachings.

 

Let’s start with the earliest statement on mindfulness. The first sermon, the ‘Rolling Forth of the Wheel of the Dhamma’, starts by dismissing the wrong practices of sensuality and self-mortification, then expounds the right way, the noble eightfold path. This consists of: right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right samadhi. This formulation of the Buddha’s earliest teaching is preserved in texts of the Theravada, Mahisasaka, Dharmaguptaka, and Mahasanghika schools. The factors of the path are not further defined here, apart from right view, which is implied in the discussion of the four noble truths. The text therefore implies that the audience was familiar with the remaining seven factors.

 

By listing the factors thus, even without further definition, the sutta does two important things. Firstly it specifies which factors are really essential for the goal; and second, it places them in a sequence implying a conditional relationship between the factors.  This relationship is spelt out a number of times. The very first discourse of the Magga Samyutta stresses the causal relationship between the factors of the path including mindfulness and samadhi: ‘For one of right mindfulness right samadhi comes to be’.[51] Satipatthana is said to be the ‘vital condition’ for samadhi, the ‘pre-requisite’ of samadhi, the ‘basis’ of samadhi. Elsewhere the path is analyzed into three – ethics, samadhi, and understanding. Satipatthana is included in the section on samadhi, not the section on understanding. All of the basic statements on the function of satipatthana in the path confirm that its prime role is to support samadhi, that is, jhana.

 

This function of satipatthana is suggested in a very common sutta idiom, whose significance tends to be obscured in translation. The term satipatthana (establishing of mindfulness) is related to the common idiom ‘one establishes mindfulness’ (satim upatthapeti). Sati and upatthapeti stand in the same relation as do saddha and adhimuccati, or viriya and arabbhati. These terms, all commonly used in conjunction, indicate a reiterative emphasis. Just as one ‘decides faith’ or one ‘rouses up energy’, so too one ‘establishes mindfulness’. In fact, we could render this phrase ‘one does satipatthana’, the difference being merely verbal. Because the verb upatthapeti has such an organic relationship with the noun sati they are found together in a variety of settings, just as sati is found everywhere. But by far the most important, common, and characteristic use is in the gradual training, where the phrase invariably precedes the abandoning of the hindrances and entering jhana.

 

The gradual training, appearing many many times throughout the early texts, must be regarded as the prime overall paradigm for the way of practice as conceived in pre-sectarian Buddhism. It typically involves the following: one hears the teaching; gains faith; abandons wealth and relatives; goes forth; undertakes the rules of discipline; purifies livelihood; restrains the senses; is content; is devoted to wakefulness; and practices mindfulness & clear comprehension in one’s daily activities. After all this, one ‘goes to a forest, the root of a tree, or to an empty hut’, sits down, and ‘establishes mindfulness’ (or ‘does satipatthana’). In a Sarvastivada version of the gradual training this implication is made explicit.[52] After the section on clear comprehension the four satipatthanas are brought in, leading as usual to jhana and then various psychic abilities culminating in enlightenment. The Dantabhumi Sutta is similar, although there the four satipatthanas are placed a little later, after the abandoning of the hindrances in the place normally taken by the first jhana.[53] All this suggests that an idiomatic rendering of satipatthana would be simply ‘meditation’. Establishing mindfulness, abandoning the hindrances, and entering jhana are the key meditative stages in the gradual training. I will refer to them below as the ‘meditative training’.

 

In the Pali canon, mindfulness is described in two stock formulas. The simpler one emphasizes the older meaning of ‘memory’.

 

‘Here, monks, a noble disciple is mindful, endowed with highest mindfulness and self-control, able to remember, to keep in memory what was said and done long ago.’ [54]

 

This formula does not explicitly treat mindfulness as meditation. It is less closely associated with satipatthana as such rather than simply ‘mindfulness’, although this distinction is most tenuous and artificial. As I have shown elsewhere, the term nepakka, ‘self-control’, here implies sense restraint, not wisdom as the commentaries suggest.

 

The Sarvastivada offers a description of mindfulness not entirely identical with the Theravada.

 

‘When there is mindfulness for, mindfulness against, or having no mindfulness towards (anything) he is mindful, widely mindful, keeping in mind, not forgetful. This is called right mindfulness.’[55]

 

It is not immediately apparent what is meant here. Evidently there is some abhidhamma-style influence in this kind of definition. Perhaps the mysterious first three terms refer to the practice, which we will meet later, of perceiving the beautiful in the ugly, the ugly in the beautiful, and avoiding both through equanimity.

 

The next layer of complexity describes satipatthana as fourfold. It is important to note that, in keeping with the pragmatic and relativist perspective of the suttas, this is not a definition of mindfulness but a prescription of how to practice. One contemplates ‘a body in the body: ardent, clearly comprehending & mindful, having removed covetousness & aversion for the world’, and contemplates feelings, mind, and dhammas in the same way. The phrase ‘ardent, clearly comprehending & mindful, having removed covetousness & aversion for the world’ is usually absent in other traditions. The Sarvastivada usually speaks simply of the establishing of mindfulness of contemplating a body in the body, etc., while the Mahasanghika Ekayana Sutra refers to practicing each of the four internally and externally in order to gain peace and joy. We do, however, find at least one Agama sutra that says:

 

‘With respect to the body internally, one abides in contemplation and mindfulness of the body, with refined striving and resort to skilful approaches, with clear comprehension and right mindfulness, taming the cares and woes of the world.’[56]

 

This is more-or-less identical with the standard Pali formula, with the significant addition of ‘skilful approaches’ (presumably upaya). So far as I know, this is never used in a positive sense in the Pali suttas, but is a term for defilements. This quality, which became a famous feature of the Mahayana, came to special prominence first in the teachings of Upagupta, the patriarch of the Sarvastivada, and thus seems to be evidence of sectarian interpolation. But the main point is to emphasize that mindfulness is not developed alone, sufficient unto itself, but in the context of the path as a whole, and in this all the traditions are in full agreement.

 

A key point here is that the fourfold formula introduces certain specific objects of meditation, moving towards treating satipatthana as such in a somewhat narrower way than mindfulness in general. Satipatthana is in fact the only context in the main formulations of the path – the wings to enlightenment, the gradual training, the dependent liberation – to specify the object of meditation. Generally there tends to be a somewhat curious distance in the suttas between the subjective and objective sides of meditation. For example, the suttas describe jhana in terms of the subjective mental qualities, and elsewhere describe various meditation objects that are intended to develop jhana, yet they virtually never speak of, say, ‘anapanasati jhana’ (but we do have ‘anapanasati samadhi’), or ‘kasina jhana’ (although there is a slightly dubious reference to ‘compassion jhana’.) So satipatthana, being thus more ‘grounded’ and specific, fulfills an important practical function in the path. The implication seems to be that the particular meditation objects here are an intrinsic and hence non-optional part of the path. It seems that all meditators must develop at least some of the satipatthana practices, especially body contemplation. Meditation subjects outside of the satipatthana scheme are very frequently taught in the suttas, notably the divine abidings and the six recollections, but they are apparently not so essential; however, the feelings, mind states, and dhammas associated with them may obviously be treated under satipatthana. This crossover ‘objective’ aspect of satipatthana makes it somewhat of an odd man out in the groups making up the wings to enlightenment, and we shall repeatedly see resulting ambiguities and incongruities emerging in the later attempts to thoroughly systemize these groups.

 

Why these four? Later texts of several schools suggest that the four oppose the four perversions. Contemplation of the body opposes the perversion of seeing beauty in ugliness; contemplation of feelings opposes the perversion of seeing suffering as pleasure; contemplation of the mind opposes the perversion of seeing the impermanent as permanent; and contemplation of dhammas opposes the perversion of seeing self in what is not-self. Certainly they can work in that way, but this explanation seems to be post facto and somewhat artificial.

 

I think it is clear that the four objects of satipatthana progress from coarse to subtle. I will treat this in more detail below; until we have examined the texts in detail we may be content here with some preliminary suggestions. The body is mainly treated as the basic objects for developing meditation. Feelings are the most obvious of the mental qualities. The mind, the inner sense of cognition, the ‘knowing’ rather than the ‘known’, is more subtle, and is properly approached through the first two. As we shall see, both the treatment of the terms themselves, and the correlation with anapanasati, suggest that a key facet of this progressive refinement of contemplation so far is the undertaking, development, and mastery of jhana. This much is fairly straightforward, and the traditions are more-or-less in agreement, although they sometimes tend to de-emphasize or ignore this progressive structure. This is perhaps because they treat the next factor, dhammas, as meaning various phenomena, many of which are not more subtle than the first three, and thus disturbing the sequence. I believe this is a mistake. I see dhammas here as not being a parallel category of phenomena chosen as a miscellaneous grab-bag of the left-overs from the first three, but as being a distinctively different and more profound aspect of meditation: the understanding of the causal principles underlying the development of samadhi.

 

I understand the reiterative idiom ‘a body in the body’ according to the Anapanasati Sutta, which describes the breath as ‘a certain body [physical phenomenon] among the bodies’. It should probably be more idiomatically rendered as ‘contemplating an aspect of the body’. This implies the narrowing down of the focus of awareness to a chosen spectrum of phenomena within any one of the four fields, as is essential for samadhi practice.

 

We have seen that the simple teachings of mindfulness tend to treat satipatthana in terms of samadhi rather than vipassana. Does this formula introduce any major change in this regard? The final phrase, ‘having removed covetousness & aversion regarding the world’ implies at least a measure of success in eradicating hindrances. Indeed, this phrase is sometimes replaced with ‘samadhi’. As we have seen, the Mahasanghika version of this formula in the Ekayana Sutra also emphasizes the samatha qualities of peace and joy. There is no explicit mention in any of the versions of the basic formula of key elements of vipassana such as impermanence, suffering, and not-self. However, there are two words in this formula that indicate wisdom – anupassana and sampajanna. Anupassana occurs in all versions of the formula, while sampajanna only occurs regularly in the Theravada. These are both glossed in the Abhidhamma with the standard register of terms for wisdom, which is not wrong but is equally not very helpful, as it ignores the subtleties of context.

 

Although related to the word ‘vipassana’, anupassana lacks the analytical implication of the prefix vi-. It is true that anupassana is commonly used in vipassana contexts (aniccanupassana, etc.), but it is not used when standing alone, as vipassana is, to specifically denote the meditative enquiry into impermanence and causality. The prefix anu- in psychological contexts commonly carries the nuance of ‘continuing’. Thus vitakketi means ‘to think’; anuvitakketi means ‘to keep on thinking’. The same usage occurs in the definition of sati as ‘memory’ that I have translated above. Two terms are used: sara and anussara, which we should understand as ‘remembers, keeps in memory.’ A similar nuance is evident in two of the terms used in the Abhidhamma gloss for the jhana factor vicara – anusandhanata and anupekkhanata – which should be translated ‘sustained application, sustained observation’. Anupassana is semantically parallel with anupekkhanata, and so also suggests the idea of ‘sustained observation’.

 

The term sampajanna, too, although etymologically equivalent to panna ‘understanding’, is not explicitly equated with vipassana. Sampajanna is most characteristically used in the context of ‘daily life awareness’ as a preparation for jhana, and in the context of jhana itself to express the wisdom dimension of samadhi. Most of the exercises of the Satipatthana Sutta use the verb form of panna in a similar sense, for example: ‘One understands “I am breathing in a long breath”…One understands “I am standing”…One understands “I am experiencing a pleasant feeling”…’ and so on. So there is clearly this dimension of understanding, of clear awareness throughout the meditation. We find that jhanas too can be qualified by such terms; sometimes jhana is classified under wisdom, or one in jhana is said to ‘know & see’, and so on. The mere usage of these terms cannot mean that this is a vipassana practice as opposed to a samatha practice. Reality is more subtle: all meditation must include both peace and wisdom, and any attempt to divide meditation subjects and classify them as one or the other is ultimately doomed. The question is: what is the context, how are these qualities being applied here? The contexts we have seen above suggest that the primary purpose of satipatthana is the development of samadhi, and there is nothing here to change that conclusion. All we can rightly conclude is that the development of jhana involves a dimension of wisdom. I must caution here. The last thing I want to do is to erect unbridgeable walls between different aspects of the path. Satipatthana is certainly not separate from vipassana; indeed I will show later that the section on contemplation of dhammas teaches how vipassana emerges naturally from our practice of samatha.

 

 

 

SATIPATTHANA IN THE ANGUTTARA NIKAYA

 

During the period of oral transmission when the Nikayas/Agamas were being arranged, it would have been normal for students to specialize in one or other of them. Thus the redactors would have taken care that each collection would contain enough of the key teachings to constitute a reasonably complete curriculum within itself.  And indeed, we do generally find that key doctrines are contained in each collection.

 

In the Anguttara we find a paucity of material on satipatthana. This is, however, normal, for the Samyutta and Anguttara were obviously arranged as parallel collections of the shorter suttas, and the main doctrines are mostly included in the Samyutta. Satipatthana appears alongside the other groups of the 37 wings to enlightenment in various repetitive series appended to some of the sections. One passage mentions six things we must abandon before we can have success in satipatthana: fondness of work, speaking, sleeping, and company, lack of sense restraint, and eating too much.[57] This is obviously similar to the gradual training, and reinforces the suggestion I made above that these basic practices in the gradual training are a preparation for the meditative development of satipatthana. The contemplation here is treated in terms of internal and external, which I will discuss further below.

 

The only substantial discourse on satipatthana in the Anguttara treats satipatthana purely as samatha.[58] One is exhorted first of all to develop the four divine abidings, then to develop ‘that samadhi’ in the mode of all the jhanas. Next one is, in identical terms, exhorted to develop the four satipatthanas, and to develop ‘that samadhi’ in the mode of the jhanas.

 

There is another interesting sutta, which, while it does not deal with satipatthana directly, is similar enough in its subject matter and terminology to suggest that it may have exerted some influence on later expositions. Venerable Ananda lists five ‘bases for recollection’ (anusatitthana; notice the similarity to satipatthana.).[59] They are: the first three jhanas; the perception of light; the 31 parts of the body; contemplation of death; and the fourth jhana. To these the Buddha adds a sixth – mindfulness of one’s bodily postures. These are obviously close to the Theravada Satipatthana Sutta’s section on body contemplation. The relation becomes closer when we realize that the Sarvastivada Smrityupasthana Sutra includes in its section on body contemplation the four jhanas and the perception of light. Perhaps the Sarvastivada was influenced by the present text. The fact that the Buddha added the awareness of postures as an extra practice suggests that this stood slightly outside the other, more specifically meditative, practices. It is quite characteristic of the Buddha in such cases to focus attention on the cause.[60] Thus it may well be that the Buddha chose to emphasize awareness of postures at this point in order to encourage the development of the practice that would lead on to the higher stages.

 

Another short sutta focuses on the wisdom aspect of mindfulness, although again this is not specifically within the satipatthana framework.[61] Five meditations are recommended: one should ‘clearly establish mindfulness on the rise and end of dhammas’, and develop perceptions of the loathsomeness of food, the ugliness of the body, boredom with the whole world, and impermanence of activities. These are the ‘bitter pill’ meditations designed to overcome our neurotic aversion and fear of acknowledging the negative and unpleasant side of life. It should be noted that in the Anguttara the other ‘bitter pills’, which include both samatha and vipassana aspects, are taught much more frequently than the contemplation of dhammas. ‘Dhammas’ here probably does not mean ‘all dhammas’, for these are not said to be impermanent; presumably it has the same meaning as in the satipatthana contemplation of dhammas.

 

We can summarize the teachings on satipatthana according to the Anguttara Nikaya in this way.

 

1)     Satipatthana is a meditative practice developed in the context of the gradual training.

2)     It is considered a mode of jhana.

3)     It is to be developed both internally and externally.

4)     Mindfulness of the rise and fall of dhammas is one of the practices developing wisdom.

 

The high degree of congruence of this conception with the other basic teachings throughout the canon suggests that we can regard this as an early summary of the key aspects of satipatthana. I note here in passing that none of the texts mentioned above are found in the Ekottara Agama; however this is of little significance given the generally large divergence between this collection and the other Nikayas/Agamas. The Ekayana Sutra seems to be the only substantial discourse in the Ekottara dealing with satipatthana.

 

 

 

THE SATIPATTHANA SAMYUTTA

 

Let us now examine the Satipatthana Samyutta. We can consider this together with the Anuruddha Samyutta, which is really just an appendix spoken by Venerable Anuruddha. The most striking thing here is how little development occurs. The basic formula is simply repeated in different settings with some interesting but fairly minor variations, and with similes to clarify or extol, etc. This has resulted in the relative neglect of this collection, since it is perceived as adding little to the Satipatthana Sutta. The historical perspective, however, would see it the other way around: the Satipatthana Sutta adds much to the Samyutta. 

 

Several suttas clearly identify satipatthana with samadhi practice. One sutta recommends that newcomers, trainees, and arahants should develop the four satipatthanas ‘ardent, clearly comprehending, unified, with clear mind, in samadhi, with mind one-pointed.…’[62] The foolish, unskilled meditator practicing satipatthana is criticized because he fails to gain samadhi and abandon defilements, whereas the wise, competent, skillful monk practices satipatthana, gains samadhi, and abandons the defilements.[63] By directing the mind towards some inspiring object one can overcome obstacles in one’s satipatthana practice, leading the mind to jhana; or else one can develop satipatthana in an ‘undirected’ mode, also associated with jhana.[64] Several more suttas speak of developing satipatthana after being established in ethics and right view, thus also suggesting satipatthana’s role as the fundamental meditation practice.[65] Satipatthana is directly opposed to the hindrances,[66] and also to the five strands of sense pleasures;[67] these are normally functions of jhana. These and other contexts that treat satipatthana straightforwardly as jhana have been usually ignored or marginalized, treated as somewhat peculiar variations. But if our analysis up to now has any merit it seems we should rather treat these as central and mainstream paradigms, simply restating the fundamental role of satipatthana in the path.

 

The collection opens with the famous declaration that satipatthana is the ‘one-way path’ (ekayana magga).[68] Renderings of this term as ‘the only way’ tell us more about the biases of the translators than about the meaning of the Pali. Gethin includes an interesting discussion of this phrase. He rightly cautions against the attempt to settle on a single concrete definition for such a term, which early on seemed to carry spiritual/mystical connotations. He notes that the non-Buddhist meanings attested for ekayana are principally two: the ‘lonely’ or ‘solo’ way; and a way that leads to one, a convergence point. Both meanings of ‘solo way’ and ‘way going to one place’ suit the context of satipatthana, and both are accepted by the commentators. However, only the second meaning is explicitly found elsewhere in the Pali canon. Relevant passages for the second meaning from the early Upanishads include the following.

 

‘As the ocean is the meeting place (ekayana) of all waters, as the skin is the meeting place for all touch, as the nose is the meeting place for all smells…as speech is the meeting place for all the Vedas.’[69]

 

‘The mind (citta) is the meeting place (ekayana) of all these, mind is the self (atman), mind is the foundation (pratistha).’[70]

 

Compare the use of the suffix -ayana in the Brahma Purana (which says that God first created the waters that are called ‘nara’ and then he released his seed into them, therefore he is called ‘Narayana’); and also the Parayana Vagga (which says: ‘This path goes to the beyond (para); therefore it is called “Parayana”.’).[71] Ultimately, Gethin suggests, with the support of the Pali commentary, the interpretation ‘going to the one’, i.e. Nibbana. Gethin says that the term ‘one’ here need not carry absolutist metaphysical connotations in the Nikayas. But ever since the Rig Veda spoke of the ‘One Being’ the ‘one’ was a pregnant metaphysical term for the whole Brahmanical tradition and so the suttas carefully avoid using the ‘one’ to refer to Nibbana. However, they are quite happy to use ‘one’ to refer to samadhi. Compare the usage of ekayana and citta in the above passage from the Chandyoga Upanishad. By far the most common and idiomatic usages of ‘one’ in the suttas’ meditation vocabulary are the terms ‘one-pointedness’ (ekaggata) and ‘unification’ (ekodibhava), which are standard synonyms of jhana or samadhi. Given that, as we have seen, the primary purpose of satipatthana is to lead to jhana, it seems not at all unlikely that the contextual meaning of ekayana is ‘the way leading to unification (of mind)’. This is precisely the explanation offered by the Mahasanghika Ekayana Sutra:

 

‘Why is it called the “one way in” (ekayana)? Because it is the way to the oneness of mind.’

 

Although this sutta, which I will discuss in detail below, seems somewhat later than the Theravada and Sarvastivada versions, this statement remains one of the earliest clear definitions of this phrase. Because it is in accord with the early descriptions of satipatthana in the suttas, and it was accepted by a prominent school of early Buddhists, it should be granted some credibility. This explanation would also furnish an answer to the question why the suttas reserve the term ekayana for satipatthana alone among the 37 wings to enlightenment. While all the groups are associated in one way or another with samadhi or one-pointedness, satipatthana is singled out as playing the key role of bringing the mind to samadhi.

 

Returning to the Satipatthana Samyutta, one sutta speaks of contemplating ‘internally, externally, and both internally & externally’.[72] Elsewhere this is explained thus: through ‘internal’ contemplation one enters samadhi, then gives rise to knowledge & vision (i.e. psychic vision) of the body, etc., of others externally.[73] It seems reasonable to assume that this practice could include inferential knowledge too, but the suttas do not directly say so. The purpose of this practice would seem to be to on the one hand develop and refine one’s skill in samadhi, and on the other hand to break down the conceit of self-centeredness. This practice is attested in all the Nikayas, Agamas, and Abhidhamma.

 

In one sutta, which will be of some significance later, Venerable Sariputta explains that by an ‘inference according to dhamma’, he understands that all Buddhas, past, future, and present, become enlightened by abandoning the five hindrances, being well established in the four satipatthanas, and developing the seven enlightenment-factors.[74] Bearing in mind that the seven enlightenment-factors are often treated in the suttas as virtually synonymous with samadhi, this grouping reminds us of the ‘meditative training.’ Similar groupings occur frequently throughout the suttas.

 

Two suttas exhort the monks to be ‘mindful & clearly comprehending.’ Juxtaposing these factors together implies a connection; yet it also implies a distinction. Both suttas explain ‘mindful’ as the four satipatthanas. Then they diverge, offering different explanations for ‘clearly comprehending.’ The first presents the well-known prescription for everyday awareness: ‘When going out and returning one acts with clear comprehension…’[75] As we have seen, this passage occurs most characteristically in the gradual training as one of the standard practices undertaken as a preparation for meditation leading to jhana.

 

The second explanation for ‘clear comprehension’ in contrast offers a meditative method for developing clear comprehension.[76] One is aware of feelings, perceptions, and thoughts as they arise, remain, and end. This is therefore ‘contemplation of mind-objects’, a label usually erroneously ascribed to the fourth satipatthana. Because it focuses on impermanence it is vipassana. But it is not yet complete, for it leads not to enlightenment but merely to mindfulness & clear comprehension, presumably because it does not bring within its compass cognition itself, the key to really deep insight. Unlike the postures practice, this occurs only a few times in the suttas, perhaps once in each Nikaya, and never in any important doctrinal framework. Furthermore, it is one of only 14 suttas from the Theravada Satipatthana Samyutta that is missing from the Sarvastivada Smrityupasthana Samyukta (leaving aside the ‘repetition series’). So we conclude that clear comprehension in the Satipatthana Samyutta consists of the ‘daily life’ preparation for meditation and a minor supplementary meditation. These are related but not equated with satipatthana.

 

Not until near the end of the Samyutta do we find satipatthana itself specifically treated in terms of vipassana. A sutta called ‘Analysis’ presents a threefold analysis of satipatthana.[77] Like the previous sutta, this sutta is also absent from the Sarvastivada Smrityupasthana Samyukta. We should remember that any ‘analysis’ must be later than the material that it analyzes. So even though this sutta is much shorter, simpler, and more mainstream than the Satipatthana Sutta, it must still be later than the basic teachings. First comes just plain ‘satipatthana’, the standard fourfold formula. Second comes ‘development of satipatthana’, where one contemplates rise and fall regarding each of the four satipatthanas.[78] This is vipassana proper, the contemplation of impermanence and causality. In the suttas the term ‘development’ normally means ‘making more of, improvement, enhancement’. For example in the four right efforts, the third is the effort to ‘give rise’ to good dhammas, and the fourth is to ‘mature, develop, and fulfill’ the good dhammas that have already arisen. So here the practice of vipassana regarding the four satipatthanas is depicted as an advanced practice to be undertaken by one already well grounded on the basics. Impermanence is described as contemplating the principle of arising and vanishing with regard to the four satipatthanas. The word ‘principle’ here translates ‘dhamma’. It is tempting to see a relationship between ‘dhamma’ here and in the ‘contemplation of dhammas’. That is, the ‘development of satipatthana’, rather than being a wholly new practice grafted on the basic satipatthana, emerges from, makes explicit, and fulfills the understanding of causality and impermanence that is inherent in the fourth satipatthana. Something of this nature seems to be implied by certain of the other sutta and abhidhamma interpretations. The third and final aspect of this analysis is the ‘way to the development of satipatthana’, which is just the eightfold path, emphasizing again that satipatthana fulfills its purpose only in the proper context.

 

A little below we come to a very interesting little sutta that, for the only time in the Nikayas, explains what ‘the principle of arising and vanishing’ means in the context of satipatthana.[79] The Theravada version simply lists the causes for each of the satipatthanas. The Sarvastivada does the same; but then it adds the section on ‘the principle of arising and vanishing’ (as in the Theravada Analysis Sutta and Satipatthana Sutta) and says that one dwells independent, not grasping at anything. Thus these additions effectively combine the two short Theravada suttas on satipatthana as vipassana into one. These additions are remarkably similar to the refrain of the Theravada Satipatthana Sutta; more similar, in fact, than any Theravada suttas.

 

These suttas say that the origin of the body is food; the origin of feelings is contact; the origin of the mind is name & form; and the origin of dhammas is attention. I won’t pause to consider these in detail, but we should notice that these descriptions, most obviously the first, dispose of the idea that impermanence in satipatthana means momentariness. Attention as origin for dhammas is interesting. Attention is the basis for wisdom, and is most typically treated in the suttas as inquiry into causes. This suggests that vipassana is intrinsic to this last satipatthana, as I have already hinted above.

 

‘Name & form’ is the origin of mind (citta), whereas normally it is said to be the origin of ‘cognition’ (vinnana). Obviously here citta and vinnana function as synonyms; but this bare fact does not help us to understand why this terminological shift occurs in this context. Typically, vinnana is used in vipassana contexts, such as dependent origination, the five aggregates, and the process of sense cognition. It is therefore treated under the first noble truth, and is ‘to be fully known’. Citta is difficult to pin down, for it is widely used in non-technical contexts to mean simply ‘mind’, ‘thought’, ‘mood’, ‘state of mind’. However, when it is used in a technical sense it is often a term for samadhi – the ‘higher mind’ (adhicitta), ‘endowment with mind’ (cittasampada), etc. It is therefore treated under the fourth noble truth, and is ‘to be developed’. This is why citta is appropriate for satipatthana – it encompasses both the ordinary mind and the mind developed in samadhi. But when the context is extended to include vipassana, we end up with citta appearing out of character in a role normally played by vinnana. A similar vacillation between citta and vinnana also occurs in other contexts where samatha and vipassana overlap.[80]

 

An odd aspect of this sutta is that, for the only time in the Nikayas, it treats ‘satipatthana’ in an objective sense. Normally ‘satipatthana’ (‘establishing of mindfulness’) refers to the subjective act of setting up or focussing mindfulness on one of the four fields. But here satipatthana clearly refers to the objects of mindfulness, that is, the body, etc. (‘things on which mindfulness is established’). This objective sense if taken literally is patently absurd – it entails that the body is the ‘one-way path’ to Nibbana. This might come as a pleasant surprise for some; for since food is the nutriment for the body, eating must be the nutriment for the path! But it is obviously just a loose idiomatic usage, not meant to be taken too seriously. This ambiguity of expression again results from the shift in perspective as the framework designed for samatha is extended to include vipassana. In the basic satipatthana one is operating ‘inside’ the four fields, whereas in the ‘development of satipatthana’ one has ‘pulled back’ from and objectified the process for the purpose of analysis. It’s a little like the difference between reading a story, where one enters into the characters and emotions, and reading a review of the story, where one develops a critical, analytical insight into how the story works. We shall see later that this ambiguity caused considerable confusion in later writings.

 

The Anuruddha Samyutta starts with the most complex vipassana analysis yet; however the vipassana sections are absent from the Sarvastivada version.[81] It combines the internal/external contemplation with the impermanence contemplation. So one contemplates the principle of arising, of vanishing, and of arising & vanishing regarding the body internally. Then one contemplates the body externally in the same way, and so on. Then it introduces another framework, familiar elsewhere in the suttas. One contemplates the repulsive in the unrepulsive; the unrepulsive in the repulsive; then ignores both and abides in equanimity. Remember that in the Satipatthana Samyutta Analysis Sutta one first became established on all four satipatthanas, and only then was impermanence introduced. Now, however, impermanence is introduced from the first, giving the impression, without stating so explicitly, that one may undertake vipassana from the start of practice. Here we see the beginnings of a trend that can be traced over later expositions of satipatthana.

 

Most of the rest of the Anuruddha Samyutta, however, emphasizes the samadhi aspect of satipatthana, as Venerable Anuruddha systematically ascribes his success in every kind of psychic power to satipatthana. This follows naturally from the basic function of satipatthana as support for jhana. Many of these formulaic passages are abridged in the Sarvastivada Samyukta Agama, reflecting that text’s reluctance to spell out repetitions as assiduously as the Theravada.

 

And that’s it. Excluding the ‘repetition series’ suttas, there are 74 suttas in the Satipatthana and Anuruddha Samyuttas. Only three treat satipatthana directly as vipassana and a fourth introduces vipassana in association. The Sarvastivada seems to have only one sutta dealing with vipassana in these collections, although this sutta assimilates material from two of the Theravada suttas. In contrast, excepting some of the repetitive variations on Venerable Anuruddha’s discourses, all of the suttas emphasizing the samatha dimension of satipatthana are found in the Sarvastivada.

 

To supplement this discussion I should mention the suttas on satipatthana found elsewhere in the Samyutta Nikaya. The Vedana Samyutta is clearly oriented towards vipassana, and the treatment of satipatthana reflects this fact. There are two very similar suttas taught for sick bhikkhus.[82] One should develop the four satipatthanas, have clear comprehension, and then contemplate the conditionality and impermanence of feelings. Here the development of vipassana into feelings is stated after satipatthana; and it is described as contemplating their impermanence, vanishing, fading away, cessation, relinquishment. These terms are virtually identical with the fourth tetrad of anapanasati, in other words, the contemplation of dhammas. As noted above, this suggests that the contemplation of dhammas, where vipassana finds its proper home in satipatthana, can be extended by development to encompass the other satipatthanas as well. Several suttas teach that the way to understand this cessation of feelings is through the jhanas.[83] All of the jhana suttas are included in the Sarvastivada, while the two mentioning satipatthana are not. There are 31 suttas in the Theravada Vedana Samyutta; only five are missing from the Sarvastivada, all of which deal with vipassana.[84]

 

Feelings are of course an intrinsic part of satipatthana, so it is no surprise that satipatthana is introduced in the collection of discourses dealing with feeling. However, the four satipatthanas are not mentioned at all in the Salayatana Samyutta and hardly in the Khandha Samyutta, suggesting that the sense media and the aggregates were not considered as specially related to satipatthana. The Khandha Samyutta mentions satipatthana a couple of times when listing the 37 wings to enlightenment. In one other sutta they are mentioned, but not directly in connection with the aggregates:

 

‘And where, monks, do these three unskillful thoughts cease without remainder? For one who abides with a mind well established on the four satipatthanas, or for one who develops the signless concentration.’[85]

 

Elsewhere unskillful thoughts are said to cease in the first jhana;[86] anapanasati is the normal practice recommended for cutting off thoughts. In line with the trend emerging above, this sutta treating of the samatha side of satipatthana is also found in the Sarvastivada.

 

Even though the four satipatthanas as such are not mentioned in the Salayatana Samyutta, yet there is perhaps a closer connection between mindfulness and the six sense media than we find between mindfulness and the five aggregates. This reflects a subtle difference in orientation between the two frameworks. Meditation on the aggregates is specially associated with eradicating wrong view, while that on the sense media is attuned towards transcending desire. It therefore emphasizes sense restraint, which is closely associated with mindfulness, especially mindfulness of the body. I have already quoted the standard passage above.[87] There the order of the teaching is: sense restraint; mindfulness of the body; measureless mind (i.e. jhana); understanding; release. Another passage says that a monk should train himself regarding the six senses so that they do not obsess his mind, his energy is tireless, his mindfulness is well established, the body becomes tranquil, and the mind enters samadhi.[88] Thus the usage of mindfulness here is much the same as we have seen above.

 

 

 

SATIPATTHANA AND ANAPANASATI

 

Whereas we were startled to see how little development occurred in satipatthana as presented in the Satipatthana Samyutta, we are equally startled to see how much occurs with the jump to the Satipatthana Sutta in the Majjhima Nikaya. It is instructive to compare this with the Anapanasati Sutta. This contains no new teachings, being merely a presentation of material from the Anapanasati Samyutta with a more elaborate setting. In other words this is a more normal teaching, taught more often.

 

The 16 steps of anapanasati are several times analyzed in relation to the four satipatthanas. The first three tetrads, corresponding with the contemplation of the body, feelings, and mind, are straightforward samatha (although the commentary typically tries to read them as being both samatha and vipassana). The fourth tetrad, corresponding with contemplation of dhammas, starts off with impermanence, and therefore it is vipassana, as we have mentioned above. So the main idea here is that the first three satipatthanas deal primarily with samatha, the last deals with vipassana. This confirms the idea that vipassana is mainly intended for one already well founded in the practice. In the Anapanasati Sutta, as in the Samyutta, we are told that developing anapanasati develops the four satipatthanas, developing the four satipatthanas develops the seven enlightenment-factors, and developing the seven enlightenment-factors leads to liberation. This reminds us of the ‘inference according to dhamma’ we met above, as well as the ‘meditative training’.

 

The fourth tetrad of anapanasati contemplates impermanence; but the impermanence of what? This should be interpreted in terms of the inner structure of the meditation itself. The whole course of anapanasati emphasizes a gradual, progressive stilling, appeasement, ending of activities. The breath is calmed and becomes very subtle and fine. The endless chatter of thinking is stilled and one experiences ever more refined bliss and tranquility. The hindrances end and the clamor of sense impingement fades away. This successive stilling defines the entire course of the meditation, the entire world of the meditator’s experience at that time, and must surely constitute the prime field for understanding impermanence.

 

In the Satipatthana Sutta we see, not a dainty step up in size like in anapanasati, but a massive blowout in several directions at once. Firstly, each of the four satipatthanas is expanded into a detailed exercise or series of exercises, few of which occur elsewhere in the context of satipatthana. Secondly, each exercise is followed by a lengthy section dealing with insight. This is substantially similar to the insight section in the Sarvastivada Samyukta. Given the strong conservatism that is obvious in the treatment of satipatthana in every other context, I find it very difficult to accept that on this one occasion the Buddha departed so radically from his policy. This leads me to suspect that the Satipatthana Sutta as we have it is the end result of an evolutionary process. And when we look at teachings on satipatthana outside the four Nikayas we do indeed find some concrete support for this idea.

 

 

 

THE EARLY ABHIDHAMMA: VIBHANGA AND DHARMASKANDHA

 

The Vibhanga of the Theravada Abhidhamma includes a discussion of satipatthana as one of a series of chapters dealing with the 37 wings to enlightenment. As usual, the discussion is divided in two, a ‘sutta exposition’ and an ‘abhidhamma exposition’. Generally, the sutta expositions in the Vibhanga remain, as one would expect, quite close to the suttas. They are usually regarded as belonging to the earliest strata of Abhidhamma material, and it would not be surprising if there was an overlap in the period of compilation of these passages and the suttas. Indeed, the corresponding chapter of the Sarvastivada Dharmaskandha merely adds a few extra passages to the Vibhanga; thus the bulk of the material, which is shared in common, may be a rare example of pre-sectarian Abhidhamma. At a later date the Vibhanga’s abhidhamma exposition was composed with more distinctively abhidhammic and sectarian material. Here I will discuss firstly the sutta exposition of the Vibhanga, and then the additions to the Dharmaskandha. I will reserve a discussion of the Vibhanga’s abhidhamma exposition for later.

 

In the Vibhanga the body is treated just as the 31 parts. This is clearly a much more primitive conception than the Satipatthana Sutta. The elements and corpse meditations, which are found in all three sutta versions, are also found in the Dhammasangani, so it is not clear why they are not brought in here. Feeling and mind in the Vibhanga are the same as the sutta. The Vibhanga section on dhammas has the hindrances and enlightenment-factors only, a pairing that is by now becoming familiar. Unlike the Satipatthana Sutta, here there are no introductory and concluding sentences to separate and define each section, such as: ‘And how does one abide contemplating a dhamma in the dhammas regarding the five hindrances?’ The hindrances and enlightenment-factors simply run on into each other.

 

In the Vibhanga each section is integrated with the internal/external contemplation, here elaborated slightly from the standard form found in the Samyutta. One is to cultivate, develop, make much of, and clearly define body contemplation internally before progressing to body contemplation externally, and so on each stage step by step. Then follows a word definition, obviously a later, distinctively abhidhammic addition.

 

In all of the above aspects the Dharmaskandha seems practically identical with the Vibhanga. Due to the difficulty of the Chinese it is not yet possible to determine exactly that the two were derived from identical texts, but the correlations are certainly very strong, even down to the details. For example, the Pali has the standard phrase ‘cultivates, develops, and makes much’, followed by the non-standard emphatic abhidhamma phrase ‘makes defined, well defined’ (svatthitam vavattheti); the Chinese exactly follows suit. As well as including practically all of the material in the Vibhanga the Dharmaskandha adds the following extra material. The Dharmaskandha, unlike the Vibhanga, first gives the setting at Savatthi, just as in the suttas. This seems to presage the greater willingness of the Sanskrit traditions to attribute later teachings directly to the Buddha himself; the Theravada usually waited a discrete few centuries before thus sanctifying their new scriptures. The basic satipatthana formula seems identical with the Pali. Then it says that in the past, present, and future bhikkhus will practice the same way. This is reminiscent of the start of the Sarvastivada Smrityupasthana Sutra, and reflects the Sarvastivadin perspective on time (which I will discuss more in the conclusion). As well as the parts of the body, the section on body contemplation adds the six elements, including consciousness, which is surely incongruous. Each practice is treated through the internal/external formula, but the Dharmaskandha repeats the word-definitions for each round, whereas the Vibhanga more economically has them just at the end.

 

For our present purposes the most striking addition is a vipassana refrain added to each exercise. Very roughly, it runs something like this:

 

‘Furthermore, one observes the various shortcomings, as sickness, as if struck by an arrow, as impermanent, suffering, empty, not-self, we are driven by them, exhausted, this destroying dhamma, running without stop, slowing down, unreliable, the dhamma of change and decay….’

 

This is very similar to passages in the Nikayas. It lends a strong vipassana flavor to the Dharmaskandha, yet the word ‘furthermore’ suggests that this was envisaged as an advanced, developed phase, in a similar manner to the Analysis Sutta.

 

The sections on feelings and mind are standard, except for a somewhat more extensive list of feelings, which, however, seems to add little but synonyms to the original. In the dhammas section the Dharmaskandha includes the hindrances and enlightenment-factors, and adds the six sense media. Here this section is, like the Theravada Satipatthana Sutta, located between the hindrances and the enlightenment-factors; but like the Sarvastivada Smrityupasthana Sutra there is no corresponding section on the five aggregates.

 

Another addition to the Dharmaskandha is that it defines ‘dhammas’ here as the aggregates of perception and conceptual activities. This significant redefinition was also adopted by the Theravada commentaries, and has by today become standard. Here we see a common pattern – the various sectarian schools, despite their mutual polemics, often share more in common with each other than they do with the suttas. It should be obvious that there is nothing in the actual description of ‘dhammas’ here that requires or even suggests such a definition. How, for example, can the six sense media be explained as perception or conceptual activities? Any attempt to explain this away is missing the point; for the motivation behind this definition is not to draw out the implications of the meaning of ‘dhammas’ here, but to integrate the four satipatthanas with the five aggregates. This is follows from a crucial assumption of the Abhidhamma project: that the various doctrinal frameworks of the suttas each offer a different way of categorizing the same reality; and that it is therefore possible to systematically equate all the dhammas in one framework with those in any other. The end result of this process was the complex Abhidhamma matikas, which subsequently displaced the earlier frameworks. Personally I find this to be a dubious project in general, but this is not the time to discuss the matter in detail. Suffice to notice that the original core frameworks for this project are the five aggregates, the six sense media, and, less standardized, the elements. Even in the suttas we see a tendency to treat the various faculties in a similar manner, including the five spiritual faculties, which accordingly begin to spill over from the fourth noble truth to the first three.[89] Now we see the same pattern emerging in the satipatthanas. A group originally part of the fourth noble truth, the path, is being equated with dhammas characteristic of the first noble truth, the five aggregates. The incongruity of the results reflects the inappropriateness of the method. As mentioned above, I think that the primary sense of ‘dhammas’ here is not ‘phenomena’ but rather ‘principles’; not ‘what is there’ but ‘how it works’. While ‘phenomena’ is one of many meanings of ‘dhammas’ well established in the suttas, there was a pronounced drift in the Abhidhamma period to emphasize this meaning at the expense of others, and a corresponding misinterpretation of relevant sutta contexts.

 

So as compared with the Vibhanga the differences in the Dharmaskandha are:

 

1)     All additions, no subtractions;

2)     Often incongruous (setting, six elements, dhammas as perception/conceptual activities);

3)     Sometimes hinting at sectarianism (past, present, future).

 

It should hardly need saying that these considerations all suggest that the Dharmaskandha here is later than the Vibhanga. I would guess that they both shared the same pre-sectarian text; the Sarvastivadins finalized the editorial process on that section for the Dharmaskandha, while the Theravadins, content with the simple version for the sutta exposition, concentrated on writing the new, more overtly sectarian abhidhamma exposition.

 

The chief difference in perspective between the two is clear. Apart from the contemplation of dhammas, there is no overt vipassana material in the Vibhanga. There is no mention of rise and fall, no six elements, no sense media, and no dhammas as perception/conceptual activities. We can be as confident as we could wish that the vipassana material was added later. The significance of these additions might become clearer with a more complete examination of the Dharmaskandha. But the most striking point about this material, especially that held in common between the two, is that both the content of the exercises and the basic form of the refrains are much simpler than the Satipatthana Suttas. This clearly – and startlingly – suggests that the core of the sutta exposition of the Vibhanga and the Dharmaskandha may be earlier than the Satipatthana Sutta, not to speak of the Maha Satipatthana Sutta.

 

We can posit three possible ways this passage may have been formed. It may have been constructed anew for the Abhidhamma. But why then is it called the ‘sutta exposition’? And why is everything in it also found in the Satipatthana Sutta? Secondly, it may be a cut-down version of the Satipatthana Sutta. But why should it be cut down, and why leave these specific sections? This leaves open a third possibility. If it is a ‘sutta exposition’, what sutta is it derived from? There is no closely corresponding text in the suttas as we have them. Could it be in the suttas in disguised form, buried under layers of accretions? Since the Satipatthana Suttas alone include all the material found in the Vibhanga, I believe it is plausible to suggest that the Satipatthana Suttas and the Vibhanga may both rely on an earlier source. Below I will present a reconstruction of this source, henceforth referred to as *Satipatthana Mula, following which I will explain how the Satipatthana Suttas may have evolved from this root. First, however, I would like to examine in some detail the various versions of the Satipatthana Sutta. If my hypothesis is correct, we can predict that the elements that are common between the Vibhanga and the Dharmaskandha will also be found in these texts, and that other material will exhibit a greater degree of divergence from text to text.

 

 

 

SARVASTIVADA SMRITYUPASTHANA SUTRA

 

The Smrityupasthana Sutra of the Sarvastivada school is preserved in the Madhyama Agama of the Chinese Tripitaka, translated from Sanskrit into Chinese in 389CE by the Chinese monk Sanghadeva. I will retain the Sanskrit form to distinguish it from the Theravada Satipatthana Sutta. It is not a Mahayana text, but is part of the collection of scriptures belonging to the early schools of Buddhism (Sravakayana) that became included in the Mahayana Tripitaka. The Smrityupasthana Sutra is more elaborate in some respects than the Theravada Satipatthana Sutta, and less elaborate in others. Hence it is probably neither earlier nor later, but stems from a slightly divergent tradition as the two new schools of the Theravada and the Sarvastivada finalized the textual formulations of the teachings they had both inherited from the pre-sectarian period. This final editing probably occurred shortly after the second schism, perhaps 150 years after the Buddha. I will ignore the various trivial differences in phrasing between the individual doctrinal units (‘pericopes’) in the various versions and concentrate on the significant differences in the choice of meditation exercises.

 

The Smrityupasthana Sutra opens in the same way as the Satipatthana Sutta. The setting is at Kammassadamma in the Kuru country. The teaching starts with the statement on the ‘one-way path’. After this, however, the Smrityupasthana Sutra introduces the statement that all Tathagatas, past, future, and present realize enlightenment by being established on the four satipatthanas, abandoning the five hindrances, and developing the seven enlightenment-factors. We have met such groupings frequently in the context of satipatthana. This statement was likely brought in from SN 47.12. We have already noticed that the extra emphasis on persistence through time suggests sectarian leanings. As noticed above, the satipatthana formula is presented very simply – one establishes mindfulness on the contemplation of the body, feelings, mind, and dhammas.

 

Below I list the various body contemplation exercises.

 

 

Sarvastivada Smrityupasthana Sutra

 

Theravada Satipatthana Sutta

 

1. Four postures

2.

2. Clear comprehension

3.

3. Cutting off thought

(See MN 20.3)

4. Suppressing thought

(See MN 20.7)

5. Anapanasati

1.

6. 1^st jhana simile

(Similes at MN 119.18ff, etc.)

7. 2^nd jhana simile

8. 3^rd jhana simile

9. 4^th jhana simile

10. Perception of light

(See SN 51.20)

11. Basis of reviewing

(See AN 5.28)

12. 31 parts of the body

4

13. Four elements

5.

14-18. Charnel ground contemplations 

6-14.

 

 

Let us first deal with the factors in common. These are mostly in the same order in both the Theravada and Sarvastivada texts. The sole exception is mindfulness of breathing, which in the Smrityupasthana Sutra appears in its more usual position after clear comprehension. Thus far, therefore, the Smrityupasthana Sutra is more normal. However, a swag of new practices is added, all somewhat uncomfortable in the context of body contemplation. The jhana similes are common enough in the Nikayas, although they do not, to my knowledge, appear without the corresponding jhana formulas. Their inclusion here suggests the influence of the Kayagatasati Sutta[90] in the construction of the Satipatthana Suttas. With minor variations the remaining exercises (3, 4, 10, 11) occur occasionally in the Nikayas, always in samadhi contexts. We have met the perception of light, together with some of the body contemplations, above in the Anguttara Nikaya. Its inclusion in satipatthana may also have been influenced by the standard passage on how one abandons the hindrance of sloth & torpor, being ‘percipient of light, mindful & clearly comprehending’. The ‘basis of reviewing’[91] is the fifth factor of noble right samadhi, using jhana as the basis for investigation. In all of these additions we are as far from a path of dry insight as imaginable.

 

The refrain in the Smrityupasthana Sutra speaks simply of contemplating internally and externally, then of establishing the mind upon the body (feelings, mind, dhammas) and obtaining knowledge, vision, light, understanding (probable Pali equivalents are: nana, dassana, vijja, panna). There is no mention of impermanence.

 

The Theravada Satipatthana Sutta here has: ‘One establishes mindfulness only for a measure of knowledge, a measure of mindfulness’. The word ‘measure’ (matta) here has always been a bit odd. Of course, one can try to explain it away, but the normal meaning is ‘mere’ or ‘limited’. Is it possible that there could have been an early confusion between matta ‘measure’ and patti ‘attainment’ or attha ‘purpose’? It is also perhaps a bit odd that one is supposed to establish mindfulness (sati) in order to attain mindfulness (patissati). The Chinese terms here mean ‘vision, light’. Could there have been a further confusion between something like passati and patissati? Combining the two suggestions we could arrive at: ‘One establishes mindfulness only for the sake of knowledge & vision.’ This would certainly give us a more straightforward meaning, but alas I do not possess the linguistic gigabytes necessary to untangle this tangle. The Mahasanghika version adds further to the confusion, as we shall see below.

 

The sections on feelings and mind in the Smrityupasthana Sutra are similar to the Theravada Satipatthana Sutta, but slightly more elaborate. From here to the end this sutta refers to ‘bhikkhus and bhikkhunis’. The contemplation of dhammas compares as follows.

 

 

Sarvastivada Smrityupasthana Sutra

 

Theravada Satipatthana Sutta

 

1. Internal & external sense media[92]

2. Five hindrances

 

1. Five hindrances

 

2. Five aggregates

 

3. Internal & external sense media

3. Seven enlightenment-factors

4. Seven enlightenment-factors

 

5. Four noble truths

 

 

All of these exercises are described in virtually identical terms in both suttas, as indeed in the Vibhanga and Dharmaskandha. The Sarvastivada omits the aggregates and truths, retaining the sense media as the only overt vipassana practice. As we have seen, it shares this feature with the Dharmaskandha. Here, however, this is displaced awkwardly to the beginning of the section, whereas in the Dharmaskandha it was in the middle; the more normal position would be at the end. Given this anomaly, as well as the precedents cited above, I have no hesitation in concluding that this is a later interpolation, and that the original Satipatthana Sutta included just the hindrances and enlightenment-factors.

 

The emphasis throughout the Sarvastivada Smrityupasthana Sutra is clearly on samatha. Like the Vibhanga, it omits virtually all the overtly vipassana oriented material of the Theravada Satipatthana Sutta; in addition it includes much samatha material. It remains in harmony with the mainstream teachings in treating vipassana solely as part of the contemplation of dhammas. Both schools were moving towards using the Satipatthana Sutta as a compilation of meditation techniques; but in the hands of the Sarvastivadins this became a samatha manual, while in the hands of the Theravadins it became a vipassana manual. We should remember that the significant differences are entirely in the choice and arrangement of material, not in the individual doctrinal statements (‘pericopes’) themselves.  

 

 

 

MAHASANGHIKA EKAYANA SUTRA

 

The Ekottara Agama, from which this sutra was taken, appears to be the least congruent of the four Agamas. It is usually believed to belong to the Mahasanghika school, and was translated, it seems, from Prakrit rather than Sanskrit. This school was the ‘progressive’ wing that split away from the conservative Theravadins at the first schism. Sadly, little of their literature has survived, but it must have been extensive. The Mahasanghika, like the Theravada, proceeded to further splinter into many sub-sects, with varying degrees of doctrinal development. It is sometimes suggested that the Ekottara Agama belongs to the Lokuttaravada, which was one of the most progressive of all the early schools, and in fact was probably one of the immediate forbears of the Mahayana. I will discuss below a ‘Mahayanist’ hint evident in this version of the Satipatthana Sutta.[93] The careless editing and divergence from the other sources suggests a somewhat later date than the Theravada Satipatthana Sutta and the Sarvastivada Smrityupasthana Sutra.

 

The setting, in common with the Dharmaskandha, is Savatthi rather than Kammassadamma. This could imply that it is actually a different discourse, delivered on a different occasion. On the other hand, there are anomalies in the settings of the suttas in about 20% of the Theravada Majjhima Nikaya as compared with the Sarvastivada Madhyama Agama, so I am inclined to think this is just an editorial glitch. After opening with the ‘one-way path’ statement, the sutta says this path destroys the five hindrances. The mention of the hindrances here is in line with the mainstream understanding of satipatthana, and in particular recalls the Smrityupasthana Sutra. The Chinese here translates ‘satipatthana’ as ‘ways of stopping and concentrating the mind’. As we noted before, the text says it is ‘one-way’ because it leads to oneness of mind. ‘Path’ is the eightfold path. The formula for the four satipatthanas treats each as internal and external, but omits the statement ‘ardent, clearly comprehending,’ etc. The significance of this phrase, however, is that satipatthana is developed in the context of the path as a whole, and in the Ekayana Sutra this has already been stated. In contrast with the rigid consistency of the Theravada suttas, the refrains throughout vary considerably. Thus here in the introduction, body contemplation is said to lead to the ending of unwholesome thoughts and the removal of anxiety, while the remaining three contemplations lead to peace and joy. Overall, this introduction serves as a ‘policy statement’ emphasizing the very strong emphasis on the samatha dimension of satipatthana in the Mahasanghika school.

 

Omitting anapanasati and clear comprehension, the section on body contemplations simply includes the parts of the body,[94] four elements, and charnel ground contemplations. It adds another similar practice, not found in the Nikayas, of observing the openings of the body through which impurities flow. Refrains vary. Throughout the sutra, the internal/external refrain is omitted, presumably because it has already been presented in the introduction. Sometimes there is no refrain at all. One contemplates the parts of the body to ‘realize peace and joy, end bad thoughts, and remove anxiety and sorrow’. Elements meditation ‘ends attachment’. Corpse meditation leads to ‘peace and joy’, or else to understanding impermanence. Thus we see a combination of samatha and vipassana aspects.

 

The contemplations of feeling and mind are similar in their content to the other versions, but the refrains are different to both the other versions and to the refrains of the first sections in the same sutra. They refer firstly to understanding rise and fall so that, ‘by his own insight, he realizes peace and joy. As feelings arise, he recognizes and is aware of them and their roots, and he is not dependent on them and does not give rise to feelings of attachment to the world.’  Then there follow some slightly varying versions of formulas for attaining arahantship commonly found throughout the suttas, which are obviously later additions. The refrain section generally has some affinity with the Theravada Satipatthana Sutta, which also implies, though less explicitly, that each practice can lead to arahantship. A new element is the mention of ‘roots’. Although this is not inappropriate, I suspect another translation problem.[95]

 

The refrain in the contemplation of mind includes the quirky phrase: ‘He is able to see, know, and observe what is not observable without becoming dependent on that object…’ Assuming that this is not a mere mistake, the observation of what is not observable is a distinctly Prajnaparamita-esque paradox. There is some evidence that the earliest Prajnaparamita literature developed before the Mahayana, perhaps in Mahasanghika sub-schools. For example, in the earliest translation of the Diamond Sutra the audience is just the monks, not the Bodhisattvas who gatecrashed the later renditions. Always depending on how we interpret the paradoxes, there is perhaps nothing in that version that openly contradicts the early suttas.

 

Here the statement about being ‘dependent on the object’ offers a clue to interpretation. If we are right in interpreting this phrase as showing an affinity with the Prajnaparamita we should date it around 400 years after the Buddha. In this period, the Abhidhamma schools were formulating more and more concretely metaphysical theories of ‘dhammas’. That is, they were treating the dhammas as objects really existing ‘out there’ in the mysterious realm of ‘ultimate reality’. The paradoxes of the Prajnaparamita were a direct challenge to such reified ontology. If we were to interpret our passage in this light, we could argue like this. We can only observe an object in experience, that is, in relation to consciousness. Therefore it is impossible to observe that an object exists in and of itself. If the object one is observing truly does exist in and of itself, one’s consciousness is dependent on something inherently unknowable – that is, the supposed intrinsic essence of the object. Since one cannot know this, one cannot let go of it; in other words, we will inevitably become attached to what we grasp as ‘ultimate reality’. Such was the trend of the Prajnaparamita. I am, however, not familiar enough with the thought-world of the Ekottara Agama to be confident that the author was implying something of this nature.

 

Moving on to the dhammas section of the Ekayana Sutra, we find just the seven enlightenment-factors and the four jhanas. The hindrances were perhaps omitted because they have already appeared at the start and are reiterated in the conclusion. The enlightenment-factors are presented very simply, omitting the inquiry into causes that is characteristic of the dhammas section in the other versions. It just says one develops each of the enlightenment-factors ‘in reliance on initial application, on no-craving, on destroying the unwholesome mind, and abandoning the unwholesome dhammas’. This seems like a slightly garbled version of the common formula: ‘dependent on seclusion, on fading of lust, on cessation, and ripening in relinquishment’. The Chinese appears to have read vitakka (initial application) for viveka (seclusion). The ending of the sutra with the four jhanas is similar to the Maha Satipatthana Sutta of the Digha Nikaya. It reaffirms yet again the function of satipatthana to lead up to jhana. It is interesting that the inquiry into causes, prominent in the other expositions of the contemplation of dhammas, is absent here. It seems that, while the Theravada changed the samatha aspects of satipatthana into vipassana, the Mahasanghika changed the vipassana aspects into samatha. Here the refrain has no paradoxes. The conclusion omits the guarantee of attainment found in the other versions.

 

In conclusion it seems that the Mahasanghikas, or one of their subschools, had preserved a simpler version of the Satipatthana Sutta for some time, resisting the trend to use it as a catch-all repository of meditation techniques. Of course, they may well have had other texts fulfilling this function that have not come down to us. Gradually, some expansions and explanatory material crept in. While most of this is quite in accord with mainstream teachings, the latest additions saw the inclusion of material suggestive of sectarian developments. In accordance with all the early teachings on satipatthana we have examined so far, the Ekayana Sutra strongly emphasizes the samatha aspect, while also giving due consideration to vipassana.

 

 

 

THE THERAVADA SATIPATTHANA SUTTA

 

How might this text have been formed? Apart from the Satipatthana Suttas, there are no suttas in the Majjhima, or in the Digha for that matter, which deal with satipatthana in detail. Desiring a full-length sutta on satipatthana, the Majjhima redactors selected the *Satipatthana Mula as the most promising. However, it was too short and needed filling out if it were to take its place in the Majjhima. It seems likely that the prime source was the Kayagatasati Sutta.[96]

 

The Satipatthana Sutta section on body contemplation shares the 14 exercises in body contemplation in common with the Kayagatasati Sutta, and with no other suttas. They are: anapanasati, four postures, clear comprehension, 31 parts of the body, elements, and 9 charnel ground contemplations. In the Kayagatasati Sutta these 14 exercises are presented straightforwardly. They are not included within the framework of the four satipatthanas. The refrain, repeated at the end of each section, says: ‘As he abides diligent, ardent, and resolute, his memories and intentions dependent on the household life are abandoned. With their abandoning his mind becomes settled internally, quieted, unified, and brought to samadhi. That is how a monk develops mindfulness of the body.’  The 14 exercises then lead straight to the four jhanas. Thus there is a high degree of cohesion and purpose in the internal structure of the sutta. What is more, this corresponds identically with many contexts we have encountered already, such as the ‘meditative training’, the ‘inference according to Dhamma’, and the Anapanasati Sutta – mindfulness, abandoning hindrances, entering jhana. Notice that in this sutta, sati as ‘mindful recollection/awareness’ is distinguished from its etymological cognate sara, ‘memory’, even though elsewhere sara is used to explain sati. The usage of sati and sara here may be compared with the usage of dharana and sati in the Yoga Sutra as noted above. 

 

What change, if any, would the inclusion of these 14 exercises make? The inclusion of anapanasati is uncontroversial. Similarly, we have seen the elements and mindfulness of death grouped together elsewhere with the 31 parts. The main change is with the sections on clear comprehension of body postures. As I have noted above, this is elsewhere kept clearly distinct from satipatthana as meditation. In the Samyutta it is separated, in the Sarvastivada it comes before anapanasati, and in the Vibhanga, the Dharmaskandha, and the Ekayana Sutra it is not found. Consistently, it is not treated as a meditation as such, but as a precursor to meditation. Only in the Kayagatasati Sutta and the Theravada Satipatthana Sutta is this practice placed after anapanasati. In the context of the suttas as a whole, this variation serves to exalt anapanasati by granting it pride of place. But to one not familiar with the overall context of the teaching this could be taken to imply that clear comprehension of one’s everyday activities is itself an alternative meditation, as powerful as anapanasati. This leads to the claim that the most important of the Buddha’s meditation instructions was to be mindful whatever we do. But clear comprehension as part of the gradual training is obviously a prescription: ‘If you want to be mindful, here’s what you should do.’ That is, live a life of simplicity and contentment, in harmony with nature, and devoted to meditation. Not applying Dhamma to daily life, but applying daily life to Dhamma.

 

The refrain would probably have originally consisted of the internal/external contemplation and a simple exhortation to be mindful for the sake of understanding and letting go. But since nowhere else in the Majjhima is any connection between satipatthana and vipassana mentioned, it seems that the Majjhima redactors wished to incorporate the section on impermanence from the Samyutta. This became attached to the internal/external refrain at the end of each exercise, thus furthering the idea, already hinted at in the Anuruddha Samyutta, that vipassana may be undertaken from the start of practice. It is possible that this was originally an unintended side-effect of the purely formal evolution of the Satipatthana Sutta.

 

Another consequence of the extended refrain is that each section, ending with the phrase ‘one abides independent, not grasping at anything in the world’, seems to lead all the way to arahantship. Thus the sutta has both a ‘horizontal’ dimension, a progressive deepening from one section to the next (as suggested by the phrase ‘again & beyond’ which prefixes each section), and a ‘vertical’ dimension, developing to liberation within each one of the exercises. This kind of ‘reflective immanence’ is highly characteristic of the suttas, and is no problem as long as it is understood holistically rather than divisively. That is, each meditation subject is complete, not because it replaces other approaches but because it includes them. As we have seen, this is brought out most clearly in the context of anapanasati.

 

The sections on feelings and mind are similar to all the other versions. As I have mentioned, the section on dhammas is substantially lengthened. The main interpolations in the Majjhima version are the contemplations of the aggregates and the sense media. Although these occur frequently in the early texts, nowhere else do they appear as part of satipatthana. Remember that the origin of dhammas is said to be ‘attention’, and that this explanation is perfectly congruent with the teaching of the section on dhammas as the hindrances and enlightenment-factors. It is impossible to understand, and clearly against the normal position of the suttas, how attention could give rise to the aggregates and sense media. The commentary doesn’t even try, simply agreeing that paying attention to the root gives rise to the hindrances and paying attention away from the root gives rise to the enlightenment factors. Even this alone would strongly imply that the aggregates and sense bases were a later interpolation. These paradigmatic vipassana exercises are suggestively placed after the abandoning of the hindrances but before the development of the enlightenment-factors. The normal position is that it is the enlightenment-factors, which are very close in meaning with samadhi, that bring about the abandoning of the hindrances; but here it seems we can abandon the hindrances without developing samadhi and then do vipassana straight away – an idea that was to prove highly influential in Theravada meditation.

 

We can, however, discern some differences that suggest that the six sense media are more at home here than the five aggregates. Firstly, as we have seen, mindfulness is more characteristically mentioned with the sense media. Secondly, the sense media are included in the Sarvastivada versions. Thirdly, the phrasing of the contemplation is more congruent with the sections on the hindrances and enlightenment-factors. I am still confident that both were later interpolations, but I am less confident in the case of the sense media.

 

The dhammas section in the Majjhima version closes with a brief enunciation of the four noble truths. This is then expanded greatly in the Digha Nikaya version. Some of the Burmese recensions, including the so-called ‘Sixth Council’ edition, have re-incorporated this entire section from the Digha Nikaya back into the Majjhima Nikaya, and even acknowledge this provenance by re-titling the sutta the ‘Maha Satipatthana Sutta’. This is extraordinary. While it is common for a word or phrase to slip between the cracks, I do not know any other place where a large body of text has been moved, obviously in fairly recent times. No doubt this editorial outrage was perpetrated with the idea of further exaggerating the already overblown status of the Satipatthana Sutta. But the result is rather the reverse – such clumsy mishandling leaves all-too-obvious fingerprints at the scene of the crime.

 

 

 

THE MAHA SATIPATTHANA SUTTA

 

Now I would like to examine the Maha Satipatthana Sutta of the Digha Nikaya. This is the only significant sutta in the Digha Nikaya that is not found in the Dharmaguptaka Dirgha Agama. I would therefore consider the Maha Satipatthana Sutta as a leading contender for the title of the latest sutta in the four Nikayas, a lost waif straying over from the early Abhidhamma. It is obviously just the Satipatthana Sutta padded out with further material, and again, the increase is not small. The Satipatthana Sutta treats the four noble truths with a bare enunciation. In the suttas this kind of formulation often indicates, not vipassana, but the realization of stream entry. But the Maha Satipatthana Sutta gathers much material from elsewhere in the suttas, ending up with the longest of all expositions of the truths, virtually doubling the length of the Satipatthana Sutta, and clearly presenting the four noble truths section as an extended course in vipassana.

 

The new material is mainly identical with the Saccavibhanga Sutta.[97] This sutta was delivered, with the Buddha’s encouragement, by Venerable Sariputta, and was set up specifically as a detailed exposition of the first sermon, and hence must be later than that. The sometimes pedantic abhidhamma-style definitions also suggest lateness. The Sarvastivada Satyavibhanga Sutra is substantially more developed than the Pali, with extra exegetical matter, the inclusion of ‘sickness’ and ‘association with the disliked, separation from the liked’, and a passage stating that the noble truths exist in the past, present, and future, which is a characteristically Sarvastivadin idea.[98] We have seen similar passages emphasized in the Sarvastivada Smrityupasthana Sutra and Dharmaskandha. The Theravada presentation, with minor additions, was taken up by the Abhidhamma Vibhanga in its exposition of the truths. The evolution of this material was: Saccavibhanga Sutta > Maha Satipatthana Sutta > Vibhanga. At each stage more material was added. It seems that some of the material added in the final Vibhanga version then found its way back into the Burmese Maha Satipatthana Sutta. This includes ‘association with the disliked is suffering, separation from the liked is suffering’, and the addition of ‘the cutting off of the life faculty’ (jivitindriyassupaccheda) to the definition of death. From there it then filtered down to the Burmese Satipatthana Sutta, and ‘the cutting off of the life faculty’ even made it back into the Saccavibhanga Sutta, thus ‘revolving’ in this way: Vibhanga > Maha Satipatthana Sutta > Satipatthana Sutta/Saccavibhanga Sutta.

 

The Maha Satipatthana Sutta adds a lengthy analysis of the second and third noble truths to the Saccavibhanga Sutta material. This is structured around the following series of dhammas, spelled out for each of the sense media: external sense media, internal sense media, cognition, contact, feeling, perception, volition, craving, initial application, sustained application. The Samyutta Nikaya includes a similar list, although it has the elements and the aggregates for the final two members of the list, rather than initial & sustained application. Several of the Samyuttas containing this series are missing from the Sarvastivada Samyukta.[99] Nevertheless, a similar list, again omitting the final two members, is found in the Sarvastivada Satyavibhanga Sutra. The only place I know of where the Maha Satipatthana list occurs verbatim in the four Nikayas is in the ‘repetition series’ appended to the Anguttara sevens.[100] Such sections are usually to be regarded as late, and in the present case the whole passage is ignored by the commentary. These considerations suggest that the list, even in its simple form, is probably late.

 

This list is an expanded form of the psychological analysis of the cognitive process first enunciated in the Fire Sermon, and repeated countless times subsequently. Eventually, this sequence would evolve into the cittavithi, the final, definitive exposition of psychological processes worked out in great detail by the later abhidhammikas.  Thus the Maha Satipatthana Sutta stands as an important bridge to the abhidhamma.

 

Needless to say, the vast bulk of the new material in the Maha Satipatthana Sutta is vipassana oriented, continuing the trend we have consistently observed in the development of the satipatthana texts within the Pali canon. Nevertheless, the exposition of the truths, and therefore the sutta as a whole, ends with the four jhanas as right samadhi of the path, re-asserting the basic function of satipatthana to lead up to jhana.

 

The significance of the Maha Satipatthana Sutta can best be understood in light of the structure of the Digha Nikaya as a whole. I think this is clearly the latest of the Nikayas. As many as a third of the suttas are obviously late, and many or most of the remainder may have received their final form at a somewhat late date. Reading the Digha alongside the Majjhima, the difference is striking. Whereas the Majjhima suttas are almost all straightforward in form, and both pragmatic and profound in content, the Digha abounds in legendary embroidery, many of the suttas are obvious compilations, and the forms of the suttas are often rambling and unfocussed. It is true that the Nikaya and the Agama are very close, probably closer than even the Majjhima and the Samyutta. But this is probably not because the texts were settled earlier but because the schism between the Theravada and the Dharmaguptaka occurred later than those with the Sarvastivada and the Mahasanghika.

 

However, many authentic teachings remain; and the most authentic and often repeated teaching sets out the very heart of Dhamma practice. Excepting the Brahmajala Sutta, the Digha Nikaya starts off with a series of twelve suttas all expounding the gradual training in detail. This would be pounded into the heads of the Digha students over and again as the way of training – jhana, jhana, jhana, jhana, jhana, jhana, jhana, jhana, jhana, jhana, jhana, jhana. There is little vipassana material in the Digha. A striking example of this is the rarity of the five aggregates. Leaving aside the Maha Satipatthana Sutta, meditation on the aggregates is mentioned only in the legendary context of the Mahapadana Sutta. Elsewhere the aggregates receive but a bare enunciation in the Sangiti and Dasuttara Suttas, which are proto-abhidhammic compilations almost as late as the Maha Satipatthana Sutta itself. Wisdom in the Digha is mostly treated on the planes of theory and realization, rather than vipassana.

 

It seems likely that the compilers of the Theravada Digha Nikaya, at some point after the Dharmaguptaka schism, wished to include some more vipassana material to counterbalance the strong samadhi emphasis. Now, there are three suttas treating mindfulness practice in detail in the Majjhima: the Satipatthana Sutta, the Anapanasati Sutta, and the Kayagatasati Sutta. The latter two clearly emphasize samadhi, so in choosing which of the three to ‘promote’ to the Digha the compilers chose the most vipassana oriented text and padded it out with further vipassana material to redress the imbalance of the Digha Nikaya as a whole. And in context, this was most reasonable. But when the sutta is divorced from its context and treated as an independent technique fundamentally different from the mainstream samadhi practice, a change of emphasis leads to a radical distortion of meaning.

 

 

 

THE SATIPATTHANA SOURCE

 

Having surveyed all the available early material on satipatthana, I now feel bold enough to unveil my reconstruction of what the original Satipatthana Sutta may have looked like.

The following table displays a summary of the contents of satipatthana as represented in the above materials. It shows very graphically the strands of continuity and discontinuity between the recensions. The table does not differentiate between the versions in the Theravada Digha and Majjhima. Since the treatment of feelings and mind is virtually identical in all the available versions it has been omitted here.

 

	Vibhanga	Dharmaskandha	Theravada SS	Sarvastivada SS	Ekayana
B       O       D       Y	Parts of the body	Parts of the body 6 elements	Anapanasati Four postures Clear comprehension       Parts of the body 4 elements   Charnel ground	Four postures Clear comprehension Cutting off thought Suppressing thought Anapanasati     4 jhana similes Perception of light Basis of reviewing Parts of the body 6 elements   Charnel ground	Parts of the  body 4 elements Oozing Charnel ground
D H A M M A S	5 hindrances     7 enlightenment-factors	5 hindrances   6 sense media 7 enlightenment-factors	5 hindrances 5 aggregates 6 sense media 7 enlightenment-factors   4 noble truths	6 sense media 5 hindrances     7 enlightenment-factors	(5 hindrances in intro & conclusion.)   7 enlightenment-factors 4 jhanas
R E F R A I N	Internal/external	Internal/external Shortcomings	Internal/external       Rise/fall Knowledge Independence	Internal/external         Knowledge	(Internal/external in intro only. Body: refrains vary. Feelings, mind, dhammas:) Rise/fall Knowledge Independence Arahantship

 

 

 

 

My basic principle in editing the *Satipatthana Mula is simple. We have six early texts that teach satipatthana in detail. These all have much in common which each other. They are also substantially different from any other teachings on satipatthana, being the only places that spell out the details of the four frameworks. I hypothesize that they are descended from a common source. The most likely content of this source is the shared material found in each of the five texts. However, it is possible that some material may be lost, due to editing idiosyncrasies. For example, the Theravada Abhidhamma never includes background or setting material, so the absence of such material in the Vibhanga does not suggest that it was absent from the *Satipatthana Mula. Similarly, The Ekayana Sutra is somewhat later, erratically edited, and divergent compared with the other sources. Generally, then, I include in the *Satipatthana Mula only material found in all six texts, but occasionally allow phrases found only in four or five. There is enough similarity between the versions to be reasonably confident that there was originally a refrain after each of the exercises, but not enough to be able to reconstruct it with any degree of confidence at this stage. Therefore I have supplied the *Satipatthana Mula with a suggested refrain, but have placed it in square brackets to indicate its tenuousness.

 

In such a delicate operation I run a serious risk of being misunderstood, so I must make my claims explicit. The tradition supplies us with a rational explanation of how the Satipatthana Suttas were produced; that is, they were spoken by the Buddha. That may be so. However, for a number of reasons I find this implausible. If I wish to offer an alternative, the burden of proof is on me. I must supply a demonstration of how the Satipatthana Suttas could have evolved that: 1) is rational; 2) accords with historico-critical methodology; 3) accounts systematically for the existing texts on satipatthana; 4) enhances understanding of the subject; 5) allows us to draw inferences about the evolution of doctrine in early Buddhism that may be tested by comparison with other texts, and 6) most important, is useful for practice of Dhamma-Vinaya. I believe my analysis fulfills these criteria. This, at the very least, should be enough to shift the burden of proof.

 

I certainly do not claim that this reconstruction of the Satipatthana Sutta offers an exposition of satipatthana that is complete and exclusive. Only in the later developed versions do we seem to have an attempt to assemble in one coherent system all of the chief teachings on satipatthana. It seems clear that the Buddha taught satipatthana very often in brief. The detailed meaning would no doubt have been interpreted in light of the other discourses on the relevant topics. Probably any of the suttas dealing with body contemplation could be brought in under the umbrella of satipatthana, and so with the remaining three, too. So the *Satipatthana Mula should be seen as pointing to certain core aspects of satipatthana agreed in common between the early interpreters, rather than as definitive and final. As such it remains relevant as a way of highlighting these common features whether or not there was ever an actual closely corresponding text. I make three claims. The weak claim is that the original version of the Satipatthana Sutta may have looked something like the *Satipatthana Mula. The medium claim is that the passages presented here are likely to represent the most important aspects of satipatthana as understood by the early tradition. The strong claim is that no substantially different reconstruction may be legitimately inferred from the available material, so by rejecting the reconstruction we are rejecting the validity of historical method and are flung back to reliance on the traditions of the schools. This would be rather a shame, for it would leave us unable to account for the divergences in the texts.  

 

I present my postulated reconstruction in full, without the customary elisions, in order to make it as explicit as possible. If you think the repetions are tedious, imagine what it would be like to listen to the full Satipatthana Sutta, which would take hours to speak if it were a true record of an oral teaching. 

 

 

 

*Satipatthana Mula

 

This is the one-way path, monks, for the purification of beings, for surmounting sorrow and lamentation, for ending bodily and mental suffering, for understanding the process, for witnessing Nibbana; that is, the four satipatthanas. What four?

 

Here, monks, a monk abides contemplating a body in the body, he abides contemplating a feeling in the feelings, he abides contemplating mind in the mind, and he abides contemplating a dhamma in the dhammas.

 

And how, monks, does a monk abide contemplating a body in the body? Here, monks, a monk reviews this very body up from the soles of the feet and down from the tips of the hair, bounded by skin and full of many kinds of impurities thus: ‘In this body there are head-hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, bone-marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, spleen, lungs, large intestines, small intestines, contents of the stomach, feces, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, grease, spit, snot, oil of the joints, and urine.’

 

Thus one contemplates a body in the body internally; or one contemplates a body in the body externally; or one contemplates a body in the body both internally and externally. [One establishes mindfulness on the body for the sake of knowledge & vision.] That, monks, is how a monk abides contemplating a body in the body.

 

And how, monks, does a monk abide contemplating a feeling in the feelings? Here, monks, when feeling a pleasant feeling a monk understands: ‘I feel a pleasant feeling.’

When feeling an unpleasant feeling he understands: ‘I feel an unpleasant feeling.’ When feeling a neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling he understands: ‘I feel a neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling.’

When feeling a carnal pleasant feeling he understands: ‘I feel a carnal pleasant feeling.’

When feeling a spiritual pleasant feeling he understands: ‘I feel a spiritual pleasant feeling.’

When feeling a carnal unpleasant feeling he understands: ‘I feel a carnal unpleasant feeling.’

When feeling a spiritual unpleasant feeling he understands: ‘I feel a spiritual unpleasant feeling.’

When feeling a carnal neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling he understands: ‘I feel a carnal neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling.’

When feeling a spiritual neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling he understands: ‘I feel a spiritual neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling.’

 

Thus one contemplates a feeling in the feelings internally; or one contemplates a feeling in the feelings externally; or one contemplates a feeling in the feelings both internally and externally. [One establishes mindfulness on the feelings for the sake of knowledge & vision.] That, monks, is how a monk abides contemplating a feeling in the feelings.

 

And how, monks, does a monk abide contemplating a mind in the mind? Here, monks, a monk understands mind with lust as ‘mind with lust’.

He understands mind without lust as ‘mind without lust’.

He understands mind with anger as ‘mind with anger’.

He understands mind without anger as ‘mind without anger’.

He understands mind with delusion as ‘mind with delusion’.

He understands mind without delusion as ‘mind without delusion’.

He understands contracted mind as ‘contracted mind’.

He understands distracted mind as ‘distracted mind’.

He understands exalted mind as ‘exalted mind’.

He understands unexalted mind as ‘unexalted mind’.

He understands surpassed mind as ‘surpassed mind’.

He understands unsurpassed mind as ‘unsurpassed mind’.

He understands mind in samadhi as ‘mind in samadhi’.

He understands mind not in samadhi as ‘mind not in samadhi’.

He understands released mind as ‘released mind’.

He understands unreleased mind as ‘unreleased mind’.

 

Thus one contemplates a mind in the mind internally; or one contemplates a mind in the mind externally; or one contemplates a mind in the mind both internally and externally. [One establishes mindfulness on the mind for the sake of knowledge & vision.] That, monks, is how a monk abides contemplating a mind in the mind.

 

And how, monks, does a monk abide contemplating a dhamma in the dhammas? Here, monks, when there is sensual desire in him, he understands: ‘There is sensual desire in me’. When there is no sensual desire in him, he understands: ‘There is no sensual desire in me’. And he understands how the arising of the unarisen sensual desire comes to be. And he understands how the abandoning of the arisen sensual desire comes to be. And he understands how the non-arising in the future of the unarisen sensual desire comes to be.

 

When there is anger in him, he understands: ‘There is anger in me’. When there is no anger in him, he understands: ‘There is no anger in me’. And he understands how the arising of the unarisen anger comes to be. And he understands how the abandoning of the arisen anger comes to be. And he understands how the non-arising in the future of the unarisen anger comes to be.

 

When there is sloth & torpor in him, he understands: ‘There is sloth & torpor in me’. When there is no sloth & torpor in him, he understands: ‘There is no sloth & torpor in me’. And he understands how the arising of the unarisen sloth & torpor comes to be. And he understands how the abandoning of the arisen sloth & torpor comes to be. And he understands how the non-arising in the future of the unarisen sloth & torpor comes to be.

 

When there is restlessness & remorse in him, he understands: ‘There is restlessness & remorse in me’. When there is no restlessness & remorse in him, he understands: ‘There is no restlessness & remorse in me’. And he understands how the arising of the unarisen restlessness & remorse comes to be. And he understands how the abandoning of the arisen restlessness & remorse comes to be. And he understands how the non-arising in the future of the unarisen restlessness & remorse comes to be.

 

When there is doubt in him, he understands: ‘There is doubt in me’. When there is no doubt in him, he understands: ‘There is no doubt in me’. And he understands how the arising of the unarisen doubt comes to be. And he understands how the abandoning of the arisen doubt comes to be. And he understands how the non-arising in the future of the unarisen doubt comes to be. 

 

When there is the enlightenment-factor of mindfulness in him, he understands: ‘There is the enlightenment-factor of mindfulness in me’. When there is no enlightenment-factor of mindfulness in him, he understands: ‘There is no enlightenment-factor of mindfulness in me’. And he understands how the arising of the unarisen enlightenment-factor of mindfulness comes to be. And he understands how the fulfillment through development of the arisen enlightenment-factor of mindfulness comes to be.

 

When there is the enlightenment-factor of investigation of mindfulness of dhammas in him, he understands: ‘There is the enlightenment-factor of investigation of dhammas in me’. When there is no enlightenment-factor of investigation of dhammas in him, he understands: ‘There is no enlightenment-factor of investigation of dhammas in me’. And he understands how the arising of the unarisen enlightenment-factor of investigation of dhammas comes to be. And he understands how the fulfillment through development of the arisen enlightenment-factor of investigation of dhammas comes to be.

 

When there is the enlightenment-factor of energy in him, he understands: ‘There is the enlightenment-factor of energy in me’. When there is no enlightenment-factor of energy in him, he understands: ‘There is no enlightenment-factor of energy in me’. And he understands how the arising of the unarisen enlightenment-factor of energy comes to be. And he understands how the fulfillment through development of the arisen enlightenment-factor of energy comes to be.

 

When there is the enlightenment-factor of rapture in him, he understands: ‘There is the enlightenment-factor of rapture in me’. When there is no enlightenment-factor of rapture in him, he understands: ‘There is no enlightenment-factor of rapture in me’. And he understands how the arising of the unarisen enlightenment-factor of rapture comes to be. And he understands how the fulfillment through development of the arisen enlightenment-factor of rapture comes to be.

 

When there is the enlightenment-factor of tranquillity in him, he understands: ‘There is the enlightenment-factor of tranquillity in me’. When there is no enlightenment-factor of tranquillity in him, he understands: ‘There is no enlightenment-factor of tranquillity in me’. And he understands how the arising of the unarisen enlightenment-factor of tranquillity comes to be. And he understands how the fulfillment through development of the arisen enlightenment-factor of tranquillity comes to be.

 

When there is the enlightenment-factor of samadhi in him, he understands: ‘There is the enlightenment-factor of samadhi in me’. When there is no enlightenment-factor of samadhi in him, he understands: ‘There is no enlightenment-factor of samadhi in me’. And he understands how the arising of the unarisen enlightenment-factor of samadhi comes to be. And he understands how the fulfillment through development of the arisen enlightenment-factor of samadhi comes to be.

 

When there is the enlightenment-factor of equanimity in him, he understands: ‘There is the enlightenment-factor of equanimity in me’. When there is no enlightenment-factor of equanimity in him, he understands: ‘There is no enlightenment-factor of equanimity in me’. And he understands how the arising of the unarisen enlightenment-factor of equanimity comes to be. And he understands how the fulfillment through development of the arisen enlightenment-factor of equanimity comes to be.

 

Thus one contemplates a dhamma in the dhammas internally; or one contemplates a dhamma in the dhammas externally; or one contemplates a dhamma in the dhammas both internally and externally. [One establishes mindfulness on the dhammas for the sake of knowledge & vision.] That is how a monk abides contemplating a dhamma in the dhammas regarding the seven enlightenment-factors.

 

This is the one-way path, monks, for the purification of beings, for surmounting sorrow and lamentation, for ending bodily and mental suffering, for understanding the process, for witnessing Nibbana; that is, the four satipatthanas.

 

 

 

 

THE SATIPATTHANA METHOD

 

Based on the above considerations, what can we say about the satipatthana method? The body is our primary object of attachment and identification, deeply bound up with our most basic biological drives: reproduction and the assimilation of food. Our thoughts and concerns, our worries and plans are for the large proportion of our time occupied with it – how to feed it, cloth it, house it, keep it comfortable. Any spiritual tradition worthy of the name must recognize the limitations of corporeal existence; and yet some overstep the mark, following the dangerous and unbalanced path of rejecting, ignoring, or repressing the body and its desires. The distinctively Buddhist approach is to walk fearlessly into the lion’s den. We plunge into the guts and sinews, the blood and the bones, making the body itself the prime object of our meditation. This is not from gruesome morbidity, but from the wish to truly understand, accept, and let go of this our fleshly home. We contemplate both the principle of life – the fragile, delicate breath – and the principle of death – a decomposing corpse. All of the many body contemplations found in the suttas are oriented towards letting go, especially of sensual lust.

 

The body is a solid and familiar roosting-place of consciousness, less changeable than thought, and hence forms an ideal basis for stabilizing the mind. Attention is brought to the breath, to an image of the parts of the body, or to the inner experience of physical properties such as hardness, softness, heat, and cold. As awareness is continually refocused and refined the mind sinks deeper and deeper into the chosen object. We gain a direct and quite amazing apprehension of this body that is habitually obscured beneath our desires, aversions, and fears. The more clearly we see a particular aspect of the body, the more apparent it becomes that our everyday perception of the body as an entity is largely an illusion concocted in our minds.

 

The image of the body in our mind becomes very subtle; so subtle that the mental aspect of physical experience becomes prominent. We are moving into the contemplation of feelings. Feeling may be defined as the hedonic tone of experience that stimulates reactions of attraction, aversion, or indifference. Normally feelings are somewhat dimly perceived concomitants of experience that manipulate our attention into patterns of desire and denial. We devote our lives to seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, but rarely do we take the opportunity to acquaint ourselves more deeply with these processes. Feelings are notoriously nebulous and changeable; physical feelings tend to be overpowered by the accompanying physical impact, and mental feelings are enigmatic and complex. But by treating the contemplation of feelings primarily as emerging from the tranquilizing process of body contemplation these problems are minimized. For a time our feelings become more stable, simple, and clear: a subtle and cool sense of rapture and bliss welling up from within the meditation subject. Thus the Satipatthana Sutta introduces, in addition to the usual threefold analysis, the distinction between ‘carnal’ and ‘spiritual’ feelings. Carnal feelings are those connected with the senses. Spiritual pleasant feeling is in the first three jhanas, while spiritual neutral feeling is in the fourth jhana. Spiritual painful feeling is described as depression arising as one longs for the peaceful liberations one has not yet realized – a feeling I’m sure many are familiar with! Since the spiritual feelings are primarily defined in terms of jhana there is no doubt that this classification was introduced here specifically to emphasize the importance of the experiences of refined bliss associated with samadhi. Just as we cannot know darkness until we have seen the light, we cannot comprehend the nature of everyday sensual feelings until we have the perspective of contrast.

 

One of the most astounding revelations for any meditator is the changeability of the mind’s capacity to be aware, like an eye that dilates and contracts in response to the environment. Normally this is extremely difficult to see; for we are seeing the seer itself. There is no external measure. In the contemplation of mind we see how cognition operates under different conditions: burnt up by lust, withered by bitterness, darkened and compressed by sloth. We see how the mind opens up, blossoms, and expands under wholesome influences, so our knowing has more clarity and focus. Here again, as in the contemplation of feelings, the satipatthana method gives emphasis to the ‘exalted’ mind, the ‘unexcelled’ mind, the mind ‘in samadhi’, the ‘released’ mind – all synonyms for jhana. We become acutely aware of the mind as awareness itself, soft and tender as a flower or a baby yet at the same time possessed of incredible strength and resilience. At this level of development the mind becomes in instrument of unparalleled sensitivity. One can learn to be conscious not only of one’s own awareness but those of others; hence the contemplation of mind is described in exactly the same way as the psychic power of reading other people’s minds.

 

There is an important difference in the mode of treatment of contemplation of dhammas as compared to feelings and mind. In the sections on feelings and mind one maintains a clear-eyed awareness of the various contrasting feelings and mind-states that are directly present in consciousness. Contrast sows the seeds of understanding. Here we are cultivating a wonderful garden for the flowering of wisdom; but we have not as yet turned this potential directly to inquiry into causes. In the contemplation of dhammas we become aware not just of presence, but also of absence; and this is a deeper matter, for in seeing absence one sees impermanence. But then the practice digs deeper still. Each factor is treated in terms of an investigation into causes – one understands how the hindrances arise, how they are abandoned, how the enlightenment factors are produced, and how they are developed to perfection. The hindrances obstruct samadhi; the enlightenment-factors produce samadhi. Understanding through attention the causes of the hindrances and the enlightenment-factors, one understands the causes leading the mind towards or away from jhana. Paying attention to the root eradicates the hindrances and arouses the enlightenment factors, while paying attention away from the root does the opposite. This kind of enquiry into the nutriments of the hindrances and the enlightenment factors is absolutely characteristic of the Bojjhanga Samyutta, and similar teachings occur frequently elsewhere, too.

 

In body contemplation, we apply ourselves to the meditation object. Here, we are basically just following the meditation instructions. Gradually we see the more subtle feelings and mind-states more clearly, and as the practice matures one enters jhana. At first this will be more or less a hit-and-miss affair. But as we repeat the practice over and over we understand why the mind is sometimes peaceful and sometimes not. As wisdom deepens, samadhi becomes more reliable. These are the central, most clearly and powerfully realized processes in our spiritual consciousness, so the meditator will automatically treat this as a paradigm for understanding the nature of conditioned experience in general. Thus the contemplation of dhammas sees the understanding of samatha maturing almost inevitably into vipassana. The whole process of satipatthana is so exquisitely normal it is almost misleading to call it a ‘method’. One is not deliberately applying an artificial, preconceived scheme; the various stages simply signpost the unfolding of meditation.

 

 

 

TRENDS IN THERAVADA

 

I would now like to broaden the focus somewhat, considering the claim I made earlier, that this analysis of satipatthana allows us to make testable inferences about doctrinal developments. The Maha Satipatthana Sutta is moving to a proto-abhidhammic stance, where vipassana is conceived as the systematic analysis of a comprehensive array of phenomena. A similar idea occurs in the Anupada Sutta,[101] which is one of only 22 suttas from the Majjhima Nikaya that is not found in the Agamas. There, the Buddha praises Venerable Sariputta for his practice of analytical insight based on the eight attainments. In addition to the usual jhana factors, the sutta contains a unique long list of mental factors in strikingly abhidhammic style; indeed, the Anupada Sutta is one of the key texts which has been invoked by the abhidhammikas to support the notion that the Buddha, even if he did not actually teach the Abhidhamma Pitaka itself, at least taught in abhidhamma style. But the sutta is clearly late. It consists chiefly of stock phrases and technical terms; if these are eliminated we are left with only a few lines that may be considered the characteristic vocabulary of the Anupada Sutta. These lines include at least three words suggestive of a late idiom (anupada, vavattheti, and parami). In addition, the sutta is poorly edited. The jhana factors are listed, as per the usual sutta idiom, with the conjunctive particle ca. But the remaining factors are listed in the abhidhamma style with no ca; they have clearly been inserted from another source. 

 

The Maha Satipatthana Sutta and the Anupada Sutta indicate a trend. Not only is there a shift in emphasis from samatha to vipassana; but the nature of vipassana itself is changing. The early suttas treat vipassana as understanding principles, not accumulating information. They do not treat vipassana in terms of a comprehensive analysis of an objectively defined set of mind/body phenomena – that is why the abhidhammikas have supported this idea by invoking these texts. But we should of course remember that this is merely the beginnings of a long slow process. Both the texts include jhanas. In fact the Anupada Sutta seems to treat the jhanic experience as intrinsic to the ability to clearly and precisely define each mental factor; in this it pre-empts the compilers of the Dhammasangani. 

 

It seems most likely that these texts were formulated by the Theravadins specifically to authorize their new direction. That is to say, it is not that Theravadin ‘dry vipassana’ meditation is authentic because it is taught in the Satipatthana Sutta, but that the Satipatthana Sutta was composed in order to authenticate the move towards dry insight. Of course, we should give those teachers of old the benefit of the doubt. They presumably believed they were merely ‘drawing out’ the implications of the embryonic sutta material that they were editing. I have already emphasized that the process at this stage did not involve any radically new doctrines, but merely a reshaping, a shift of perspective.

 

Having identified this trend, and having pinpointed it to the nascent Theravada, it can then – with due caution and always seeking independent corroboration – be used as a precedent. Teachings within the suttas that are highly analytic, that display the abhidhamma style of pedantic, systematic repetitions, may be suspected to be late. Thus our analysis provides us with further interpretive tools. 

 

 

 

TRENDS IN SARVASTIVADA

 

If the Theravadin emphasis on vipassana as evidenced in their recension of the Satipatthana Sutta is discernable elsewhere in the Pali canon, so too the Sarvastivadin emphasis on samadhi is apparent in their Madhyama Agama. They seem to shift the balance slightly in stressing compassion rather than wisdom, and in accord with this trend they mention the four divine abidings more often than the Theravada. There is a striking series of suttas dealing with jhana in the Sarvastivada Madhyama Agama that have no Pali cognate. These suttas are so little known that it seems worthwhile to summarize them here.

 

Dependent Liberation

 

MA 44, MA 54, and MA 55 present versions of the doctrinal framework that I call ‘dependent liberation’. This framework occurs often in the Anguttara Nikaya, and occasionally elsewhere. The elements of the framework occur in a whole range of central teachings, yet a full exposition is lacking from the Theravada Majjhima. Each of the various versions of the dependent liberation presents a series of factors unfolding in a conditional sequence that culminates in Nibbana. The sequences here are very similar to the Pali, yet have no exact cognate.

 

MA 44: Mindfulness & clear comprehension[102] > protection of the sense faculties > protection of precepts > non-remorse > gladness > rapture > bliss > samadhi > knowledge & vision of things as they have become > repulsion > fading of lust > liberation > Nibbana.

 

MA 54: Honoring and attending upon > approaching > listening to the good Dhamma > giving ear[103] > consideration of the meaning of the Dhamma > learning the Dhamma by heart[104] > recital > reflective acceptance[105] > faith > right consideration[106] > mindfulness & clear comprehension > protection of the sense faculties > protection of precepts > non-remorse > gladness > rapture > bliss > samadhi > knowledge & vision of things as they have become > repulsion > fading of lust > liberation > Nibbana.

 

MA 55: Ignorance > conceptual activities > cognition > name & form > six sense media > contact > feeling > craving > grasping > existence > birth > aging and death > suffering > faith > right consideration > mindfulness & clear comprehension > protection of the sense faculties > protection of precepts > non-remorse > gladness > rapture > bliss > samadhi > knowledge & vision of things as they have become > repulsion > fading of lust > liberation > Nibbana.

 

Venerable Anuruddha

 

In the Theravada Majjhima Nikaya Venerable Anuruddha appears in a few discourses, typically dealing with samadhi, but he only delivers one full-length discourse. The inclusion of three major extra discourses by Venerable Anuruddha suggests that his mode of teaching found greater favor in the Sarvastivada than in the Theravada.

 

MA 80 (*Kathinadhamma Sutta): Although this charming story is not found in the Nikayas, the background events are included in the commentary to Dhammapada 93. At Venerable Anuruddha’s request, Venerable Ananda organized a group of monks to sew replacements for Venerable Anuruddha’s worn-out robes. The Buddha noticed the monks sewing, and asked Venerable Ananda why he had not informed him so that he could help in sewing the robes. The Buddha then joined in with the monks to help sew Venerable Anuruddha’s robes. When they were finished, the Buddha lay down to ease his sore back and asked Venerable Anuruddha to deliver a speech on kathina to the monks. Venerable Anuruddha spoke of how he embraced the monk’s life, observed the precepts, abandoned the hindrances, developed meditation, attained the four jhanas, and finally the six clear knowledges culminating in arahantship. The Buddha sat up, praised Venerable Anuruddha, and encouraged the monks to practice these kathina dhammas.

 

MA 218: Venerable Anuruddha is asked how a monk is said to die as a noble one. He explained that if one attained the four jhanas one would die as a noble one, but not as absolutely noble. However if one developed the six clear knowledges culminating in arahantship one was said to die with a noble mind that was supreme and absolute.

 

MA 219: Similar, but here the question is how to die without distress. Venerable Anuruddha then taught that one who had correct view and precepts beloved of the noble ones, the four satipatthanas, the four sublime abidings, and the four formless attainments would die without distress. However, only one who could eliminate the bodily touch (?)[107] and through understanding evaporate the defilements would die absolutely without distress. Here the mention of ‘correct view’ and ‘precepts’ echoes the Satipatthana Samyutta. The four satipatthanas occur here in place of the four jhanas, as occasionally in the Nikayas too.

 

Miscellaneous

 

MA 176: Describes four people: one whose meditation was regressing but they thought it was progressing; one whose meditation was progressing but they thought it was regressing; one whose meditation was regressing and they thought it was regressing; and one whose meditation was progressing and who thought it was progressing.

 

MA 117: Describes another four kinds of meditators. The following scheme is repeated for each of the eight attainments.

1)     Attained first jhana but does not hold on to the practice, does not pay attention to the basis[108], but harbors thoughts connected with desire. They would not stand fast, nor progress, but would regress.

2)     Attained first jhana, holds on to the practice, pays attention to the basis, establishes their mind on that dhamma and makes it one-pointed. They would not regress, nor progress, nor become repulsed, but would stand fast with long-lasting samadhi.

3)     Attained first jhana but does not hold on to the practice, does not pay attention to the basis, but inclines their mind to the second jhana, wishing to progress further. They would not regress, nor stand fast, nor become repulsed, but before long would progress to the second jhana.

4)     Attained first jhana but does not hold on to the practice, does not pay attention to the basis, but inclines their mind to extinction, calmness, absence of desire. They would not regress, nor stand fast, nor progress, but before long they would experience repulsion and evaporate the defilements.

 

MA 222: To understand each of the 12 links of the dependent origination one should develop: the four satipatthanas; the four right efforts; the four bases of psychic power; the four jhanas; the five spiritual faculties; the five spiritual powers; the seven enlightenment-factors; the noble eightfold path; the ten spheres of totality;[109] the ten dhammas of the adept.

 

 

 

SATIPATTHANA IN LATER THERAVADA

 

I would now like to examine how satipatthana came to be treated in the Theravada Abhidhamma and commentarial literature. I have already discussed the treatment in the sutta exposition of the Vibhanga, an early stratum of the Abhidhamma Pitaka. I will now turn to a discussion of the second part of the Vibhanga’s treatment, the abhidhamma exposition.

 

This treats satipatthana purely as it occurs in the abhidhammic ‘transcendental jhana’. Note that the idea of ‘transcendental jhana’ is presented here, quite correctly, as a peculiarly abhidhammic doctrine. It would therefore be a mistake, according to the Abhidhamma itself, to use this concept to interpret the suttas. It has its interest, however, in showing how closely the Theravada school, at this early stage, equated satipatthana with their conception of jhana.  The basic passage is an adaptation of the standard description of transcendental jhana in the Dhammasangani:

 

‘How does a monk abide contemplating a body in the body? Here, on the occasion when a monk develops transcendental jhana – which leads out [of samsara], brings dispersal [of rebirth], for the abandoning of pernicious views, for the attainment of the first stage [i.e. stream-entry] – quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unskillful qualities, he enters and abides in the first jhana, which has initial & sustained application and the rapture & happiness born of seclusion, on the painful way of practice with sluggish clear knowledge contemplating a body in the body; on that occasion what is mindfulness, recollection … right mindfulness, enlightenment-factor of mindfulness, path-factor, included in the path –  this is called satipatthana. Remaining dhammas are associated with satipatthana.’[110]

 

This is to be repeated with appropriate variations for the various jhanas, stages of enlightenment, etc. Most of the variations are not spelled out in the text. The whole thing is then taken through two rounds, one for the path, one for the fruit. Here there are a number of both continuities and discontinuities with the earlier accounts. The basic descriptions of jhana and satipatthana are identical to the suttas. The close relation between the two is characteristic of the suttas, although they do not equate the two quite as explicitly as here. The mention of the painful way of practice is curious. In the suttas this is contrasted with jhanas; while it would be a mistake to see this in the context of the suttas as implying a separate path than jhana, it is incongruous to call the jhana itself ‘painful’. ‘Satipatthana’ itself is defined just as ‘sati’; that is, satipatthana is simply the subjective act of mindfulness. Other dhammas are ‘associated with satipatthana’; this seemingly innocuous phrase in fact reveals an underlying tension in the development of a strictly abhidhammic interpretation of satipatthana. For ‘association’ is a technical abhidhamma term that only applies to interdependent mental phenomena, and yet here it is supposed to include the body as well. More on this below.

 

Contrary to the traditions, there is no reason to suppose that time should be interpreted here in terms of the definitive, atomic theory of ‘mind-moments’ (cittakkhana) that came to dominate the later metaphysics. The theory of moments was not yet developed at the time of the composition of the Abhidhamma Pitaka. As far as I know the only reference to ‘moments’ in the Abhidhamma Pitaka is to the ‘moment of rebirth’ in the Vibhanga.[111] There are plenty of contexts in the Abhidhamma that treat time in an everyday sense.[112] As always with the historical method, we should try to interpret, not by looking back through the lens of later tradition, but forward through the lens of earlier tradition. The Abhidhamma Pitaka was obviously written by and intended for those who were already familiar with the thought-world of the early teachings. The Vinaya Pitaka begins each passage with ‘On that occasion…’ (tena samayena); the Sutta Pitaka uses ‘On one occasion…’ (ekam samayam); and the Abhidhamma Pitaka uses ‘On whatever occasion…’ (yasmim samaye). All these idioms treat time in a non-specific, common sense manner. The difference between them is not in the duration of time that they envisage, but in that the suttas and vinaya are specific, the abhidhamma is general. The sutta and vinaya idioms are intended to ground the teachings in time and place, to lend a concreteness and historicity to them. Thus they emphasize how the particular teachings are true and useful relative to context. The abhidhamma wants to universalize, de-contextualize; this is part of its movement towards a conception of abstract, absolute truth.

 

There is nothing in the description of transcendental jhana to suggest that it was meant to be applied purely to the moment immediately preceding enlightenment, which was the developed interpretation. On the contrary, the language clearly implies duration; the Pali term indicating duration, viharati (abides), is mentioned twice. Time is treated in the transcendental jhana in just the same way as the normal jhana leading to rebirth. For the Vibhanga, ‘during’ the transcendental ‘path’, one ‘abides’ ‘contemplating the body’, ‘cultivating, developing, making much of’ a ‘way of practice’ that may be either ‘sluggish’ or ‘swift’, and which ‘leads’ to enlightenment.

 

‘Transcendental jhana’ is not contrasted with ‘non-transcendental jhana’ in terms of time, but in terms of object and result. The treatment of result is straightforward and conforms with the suttas – non-transcendental jhana leads to rebirth, transcendental jhana leads to enlightenment and dispersal of rebirth.

 

The treatment of object is trickier. For the Dhammasangani, non-transcendental jhana is based on one of the various meditation subjects such as kasinas, divine abidings, corpses, etc.[113] Transcendental jhana on the other hand is based on emptiness, signlessness, or desirelessness.[114] But the Vibhanga is confusing that distinction. The problem arises because the Vibhanga wants to apply the idea of transcendental jhana to the various wings to enlightenment. Of those groups, satipatthana is the only one to specify the object of meditation. It would be difficult to explain how, in the transcendental path and fruit, one was ‘contemplating the body’, since the object of the transcendental jhana is supposed to be Nibbana. The later traditions seem to have hesitated over this one; the sub-commentary to the Vibhanga suggests that the mention of the body, feelings, mind, and dhammas here distinguishes the various satipatthanas by way of approach.[115] This seems to imply that one is not literally contemplating the body at this point, but that the contemplation of the body has been the predominant preparatory factor. This of course is not what the passage says. The Visuddhimagga addresses the issue thus.

 

‘When they [i.e. the 37 wings to enlightenment] are found in a single consciousness in this way [i.e. at the path-moment], just the one mindfulness that has Nibbana as its object is called the ‘four satipatthanas’ by virtue of its accomplishing the function of abandoning the notions of beauty, etc., with regard to the body, etc.’[116]

 

This is neat; but it is quite patently not what the Vibhanga is talking about. To me it seems that the Vibhanga is caught in an awkward developmental stage. It is not clear whether it wishes to present this transcendental jhana as a kind of ‘vipassana samadhi’ (if I may borrow still later terminology) where one is abiding absorbed in the contemplation of the body as empty of self, or as a kind of enlightenment experience. The Dhammasangani has forced a wedge between the non-transcendental jhana and the transcendental jhana and identified the path with the latter. But the Abhidhamma Pitaka remains close enough to the thought-world of the suttas that it struggles to apply this conception consistently. Not until the fully-fledged metaphysics of the mature commentarial phase of abhidhamma were the implications of this breach made explicit.

 

It hardly needs saying that, apart from the discrete mention of the word ‘emptiness’, vipassana is entirely in the background during this exposition. Even ‘emptiness’ cannot really mean vipassana here, for it applies just as much to the fruit as to the path. In fact it would seem as if this presentation was intended to emphasize in the most explicit way possible how jhana is as intrinsic to the very idea of satipatthana as it is to the path itself. Indeed the compilers of the Abhidhamma seem to have taken to heart the sutta saying that ‘samadhi is the path’. So much the stranger then, that the later conception of transcendental jhana, which was orthodox from the time of the Visuddhimagga, in time became one of the key conceptual tools used to wriggle out of the necessity for practicing jhana as part of the eightfold path, substituting dry insight meditation based on satipatthana; one only need enter the mind-moment of jhana at the time of realization itself. This is not only a grave distortion of the suttas, it is a misunderstanding of the very nature of the transcendental path. This was conceived as a perfected path, the culmination and consummation of the various practices that make up our spiritual journey. Thus transcendental jhana is not a non-jhana, it is not something else that can be substituted for jhana; it is the ideal, the quintessence of jhana, which naturally emerges as the practice of jhana matures in balance and harmony with the rest of the path.

 

To my knowledge, the superfluity of jhana is first explicitly suggested in the Puggala Pannatti.[117] Although most of the material in this minor Abhidhamma work is derived from the Anguttara Nikaya with only minor modifications and is therefore early, here the use of purely abhidhammic doctrines shows that the ideas underlying the Dhammasangani must have been already current when this passage was composed. It describes four people who are mentioned in the Anguttara Nikaya.[118] One gains ‘samatha of the heart within’ but not ‘vipassana into principles pertaining to the higher understanding’. A second person has vipassana but not samatha, a third has neither, and a fourth has both. The Anguttara describes samatha here as steadying, settling, unifying, and concentrating the mind in samadhi, which is similar to the Puggala Pannatti’s description as one who gains the form or formless attainments. But whereas the Anguttara describes vipassana as the seeing, exploring, and discerning of activities, the Puggala Pannatti speaks of one who possesses the transcendental path and fruit. This is obviously incongruous – the sutta is quite clearly speaking of the contemplative investigation of conditioned phenomena. For the suttas, both samatha and vipassana should be developed and only then will the one enter the path.[119] But if one already has the transcendental attainments, why bother developing mere mundane jhana? A further incongruity is that the transcendental path and fruit, as we have seen, is invariably described in the Abhidhamma in terms of jhana, yet here one is able to get the path and fruit without having ‘samatha of the heart within’. The passage does not clarify just how one can gain the transcendental jhana without non-transcendental jhana; and this omission is made even more pointed when we notice that this short passage in the Puggala Pannatti follows close behind a full-length exposition of the gradual training, presenting jhanas right in the heart of the path just as in the suttas.[120] 

 

The next discussion of satipatthana occurs in the Kathavatthu, a polemical work of the Theravada school dedicated to refuting the wrong views of other schools of Buddhism. This is generally agreed to be the latest book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka. A controversy arises, seemingly due to the ambiguity we noted above between the normal, subjective meaning of satipatthana (‘the act of establishing mindfulness’) and the objective sense required in the one sutta dealing with vipassana (‘things on which mindfulness is established’). The heretic asserts that all dhammas are satipatthana. The Theravadin quite properly shows the incoherence of this idea. The four satipatthanas only manifest with the arising of a Buddha; if there were no Buddha would all dhammas disappear? If everything is satipatthana, then do all beings practice satipatthana? But although the Kathavatthu rightly shows the problem it does not indicate how to reconcile this with the sutta.

 

The next book to consider is the Patisambhidamagga. This may be described as an elaborate compilation of the path of practice from the Theravadin perspective. The style is similar to the Abhidhamma Pitaka, but it is included in the Khuddaka Nikaya of the Sutta Pitaka. However A.K. Warder, editor of the English translation and a leading expert in dating Pali texts, regards its final compilation at perhaps 200BC or even later, which makes it later than the Abhidhamma Pitaka. Bhikkhu Nyanatiloka concurs in placing the Patisambhidamagga later than the Abhidhamma. And indeed, the treatment of satipatthana bears this out. The section on the body gives a unique list: earth, water, fire, air, head hair, body hair, outer skin, inner skin, flesh, blood, sinew, bone, and marrow. Feeling is simply pleasure, pain, and neutral feeling. Mind is treated as the sutta, with the addition of the six kinds of sense cognition; we have already seen that the treatment of citta in terms of vinnana in satipatthana signals the shift from samatha to vipassana. In the corresponding section on anapanasati, however, mind is defined with a list of synonyms lifted from the Dhammasangani. Dhammas are all dhammas except body, feeling, and mind; or, in the anapanasati section, a list of 201 dhammas derived from the beginning of the Patisambhidamagga. Both of these are similar to the developed conception of dhamma embodied in the Maha Satipatthana Sutta and the Dharmaskandha. The position of the Patisambhidamagga is thus curiously similar to the heretical view that had been refuted in the Kathavatthu. The Patisambhidamagga wriggles out of the dilemma by means of an obscure passage that seems to have become the accepted Theravada solution. The body (etc.) is an establishing, but is not mindfulness; mindfulness is both an establishing and mindfulness. The solution is a way of avoiding having to admit that the idea of considering the satipatthanas as objects is really incoherent. It ignores the fact that ‘establishing’ and ‘mindfulness’ are quasi-synonyms;[121] and the solution runs aground in the context of the fourth satipatthana: at least some dhammas are mindfulness, i.e. the enlightenment-factor of mindfulness. Notice that the contexts that emphasize the samatha aspect of satipatthana – most of the suttas and the Abhidhamma Vibhanga – treat satipatthana purely as subjective, whereas contexts that emphasize the vipassana aspect – the Samyutta Analysis Sutta and the Patisambhidamagga – spell out the objective interpretation.

 

In the Patisambhidamagga, each item in each section (‘earth’, ‘water’, etc.) is contemplated from the start in terms of impermanence, suffering, not-self, repulsion, fading away, cessation, and relinquishment. This virtually completes the process of ‘vipassanizing’ satipatthana. At first satipatthana was just samatha, the way of getting jhana. Then vipassana was seen to emerge through understanding the process of samadhi in contemplation of dhammas. Then vipassana was introduced as an advanced mode for one established on all four satipatthanas.[122] Next vipassana was introduced following each of the four sections.[123] In the Satipatthana Sutta (Theravada only) it became affixed at the end of each exercise within the four sections. Finally in the Patisambhidamagga vipassana is connected to each item in each section. The ultimate outcome in this process would be to marginalize or discard the original four objects of satipatthana altogether, abstract the vipassana aspect of satipatthana as constituting the real essence of the practice, and therefore treat satipatthana purely as contemplation of impermanence, etc., on any miscellaneous phenomena. We shall see that this step was in fact taken in the next strata of abhidhamma/commentarial literature.

 

I might briefly mention here the Vimuttimagga. This is a commentarial compilation that seems to have been the model for the Visuddhimagga. It only mentions satipatthana under anapanasati, adding nothing to the suttas. It does, however, introduce a very significant concept, the path of ‘dry insight’, which is conspicuous by its absence from the suttas and its prominence in contemporary meditation circles. The path of dry insight, however, is here not connected with satipatthana.

 

The Satipatthana Sutta eventually received an extensive commentary in the classical Theravada.[124] This subjects each of the aspects of satipatthana to a detailed exposition utilizing the fully developed apparatus of the mature abhidhammic and commentarial systems. There is obviously a very strong emphasis on vipassana throughout; nevertheless, the samatha perspective is not completely neglected. When recommending approaches for different character types, body and feelings are suggested for samatha yogis, while the mind and dhammas are appropriate for vipassana yogis.[125] The mention of the mind here as vipassana is surely incongruous, for the commentary itself agrees that many terms in the contemplation of mind refer to jhana. In one place the commentary suggests an interpretation that ‘mindfulness’ means samatha while ‘clear comprehension’ means vipassana.[126] In the discussion on anapanasati it says, in conformity with the suttas and the Visuddhimagga, that ‘the four jhanas arise in the sign of breathing. Having emerged from the jhana, he lays hold of either the breath or the jhana factors [for developing vipassana].[127] The section on clear comprehension has an interesting piece of advice for over-enthusiastic yogis:

 

‘In this matter, a person who experiences pain in every moment due to standing long with bent or stretched hands or feet does not get concentration of mind, his subject of meditation entirely falls away, and he does not obtain distinction (jhana and so forth). But he who bends or stretches his limbs for the proper length of time does not experience pain, gets concentration of mind, develops his subject of meditation, and attains distinction.’[128]

 

The Sub-commentary adds some interesting points:

 

‘Mindfulness denotes samadhi, too, here on account of the inclusion of mindfulness in the aggregate of samadhi.’[129]

 

‘Confusion is the state of mind which, because of the whirling in a multiplicity of objects, is jumping from thing to thing, diverse of aim, and not one-pointed.’[130]

 

‘If wisdom is not very strong in the development of concentration there will be no causing of contemplative attainment.’[131]

 

Thus throughout both the commentary and sub-commentary, although both strongly emphasize vipassana, there remains a recognition of the samatha aspects of satipatthana.

 

 

 

MINDFULNESS IN SANSKRIT BUDDHISM

 

I would like to offer a brief survey of some statements on mindfulness in the later non-Theravada texts. This is not intended to be comprehensive or authoritative. My own acquaintance with this vast and obscure literature is not great. I merely propose to present some bits and pieces I have stumbled across in my reading. I am precariously dependent here on secondary sources and translations, and so any attempt at interpretation is most tenuous; I am primarily interested in suggesting some lines of continuity between the kind of perspective on satipatthana I have developed in this essay and later traditions. Let me, therefore, start with some random, unembellished quotes.

 

‘It is the persevering practice (of the four satipatthanas) that is called “samadhi.” ’

Nagarjuna, ‘Letter to a Friend’

 

‘He who has established mindfulness as a guard at the doors of his mind cannot be overpowered by the passions, as a well-guarded city cannot be overcome by the enemy.’

Asvaghosa, ‘Saundarananda Kavya’

 

‘…constant mindfulness

Which gains in keenness by devoted zeal

And zeal arises if one comes to know

The greatness that lies in inner stillness.’

Santideva ‘Siksasamuccaya’ Karika 7-8

 

‘If an excessive preoccupation with external activities has been avoided with the help of mindfulness & clear comprehension, then, thanks to them, the mind can steadily keep to a single object as long as it wishes.’

Santideva, ‘Siksasamuccaya’

 

Thus these great teachers all acknowledge the samadhi aspect of mindfulness. There is some evidence that the Sanskrit traditions, starting with the Sarvastivada, emphasized samadhi more than the Theravada. This emphasis was not only reflected in the philosophical differences, but in lifestyle, too. Venerable Sanakavasin, the preceptor of Venerable Upagupta, the most famous of the Sarvastivada patriarchs, was reported to have said:

 

‘Clothed in hempen robes, I have attained the five stages of jhana.

Seated in jhana among the mountain peaks and lonely valleys, I meditate.’[132]

 

Venerable Upagupta himself took over Venerable Sanakavasin’s monastery at Mount Urumunda, which was called ‘the foremost of the Buddha’s forest domains, where the lodgings are conducive to samatha.’[133]

 

These sages embodied the austere forest tradition, clad in unkempt hempen rags, living in remote mountains and jungles, sometimes depicted with long hair and beard. It has been argued, with some plausibility, that this kind of lifestyle inspired the early Mahayana, which began as a ‘back-to-nature’ reform movement of unconventional forest yogis who, as ‘bodhisattvas’, took as their chief inspiration the ascetic, meditative lifestyle of the Bodhisattva. Similar reform movements spring up from time to time, and it might be maintained that they are a necessary countercurrent to the tendency of religions to urbanize and ossify. In contrast, Venerable Moggaliputtatissa, Venerable Upagupta’s opposite number among the Theravada, was the archetypical scholar, master of subtle logic and dialectic.

 

A difference in the attitude towards mindfulness in these different schools is evidenced in their respective abhidhammas. For the Theravadins, mindfulness was an exclusively skilful mental quality; it could not coexist with unwholesome states of mind. This leaves a rather embarrassing gap. Despite attempts to systematically list all possible mental factors, the Theravada abhidhamma has no term for memory. If sati meant memory, this would mean that one could have no memory of unskillful states of mind, which is, alas, all too obviously not the case. Venerable Nyanaponika was perhaps the first abhidhammika to notice this anomaly; he suggests sanna could perform the role of memory. But while sanna has some connection with memory, it is not used in the required sense of ‘recollection’. Sanna is always present in consciousness, recollection is not. This problematic position of the Theravadins seems to have developed out of a wish to exalt the role of mindfulness. The Sarvastivadins, with no such agenda, were happy to take the sutta references to ‘wrong mindfulness’ at their face value and treat sati as both good and bad. In general agreement with the Indian traditions, they treat sati as the ‘not-forgetting’ or ‘retention’ of the object, the, as it were, ‘repetition’ of the object leading to non-distraction. These descriptions suggest the samatha dimension of mindfulness.

 

I will examine the Sarvastivada position in some more detail using Vasubandhu’s classic Abhidharmakosa. This is an interesting text, for it presents a thorough and clear description of the field of Sarvastivada Abhidharma from the point of view of an author who is not committed to that school, but has leanings towards the Sautrantika. The Kosa defines the intrinsic nature of satipatthana not as ‘mindfulness’, but as ‘understanding’ (panna). The Sarvastivadins arrive at this definition through taking the term anupassana to express the essence of satipatthana. We have seen that the Theravadins agree in taking anupassana as ‘understanding’, but they still treat satipatthana itself as mindfulness, not wisdom. Here the Sarvastivadins run smack into absurdity. They must conclude that satipatthana belongs, not with the path factor of right mindfulness, but with right view; not with the spiritual faculty of mindfulness, but with understanding.[134] Evidently this problem arose because of their strong substantialist leanings; instead of taking anupassana as encouraging a process of careful observation, they reify it into a fundamental substance that is the real essence of satipatthana. But the same problem must arise for anyone who equates satipatthana with vipassana – satipatthana as faculty, power, enlightenment-factor, or path factor is always distinguished from understanding, and when the factors are grouped together, it is included with samadhi.

 

However a closer look suggests that mere terminological confusion is at least part of the problem. Generally speaking, the description of the path according to the Sarvastivada, which was later adapted by the Mahayanists too, falls into five stages: the paths of accumulation, reaching, vision, development, and the adept. A very simple summary is sufficient for our purposes. The path of accumulation includes all the early stages from learning the teachings, ethics, etc., up to jhana; the path of reaching is vipassana; vision is stream-entry; development is the further development of the noble eightfold path by the noble ones; and the adept is the arahants.  In the path of accumulation the approach to meditation is exemplified with anapanasati for cutting off thinking and the ugliness of the body for dispelling lust.[135] They are treated primarily as samatha; ugliness is specifically said to be not impermanence, etc.[136] Nevertheless, anapanasati is defined as ‘understanding’.[137] The definition of anapanasati and satipatthana as ‘understanding’ should be evaluated in light of the very broad treatment of understanding in Sarvastivadin theory. For example, jhana is also defined as ‘understanding’, and is said to have samatha and vipassana yoked together.[138] Evidently in such contexts we are to take ‘understanding’ in the sense of ‘clear awareness’, which we have seen is a prominent theme in these contexts in the Nikayas/Agamas too.

 

In bizarrely direct contradiction with the suttas, the Kosa says that anapanasati is cultivated with neutral feeling because:

 

‘…pleasant and painful feelings are favorable to thinking; thus anapanasati, which is the opposite of thinking, cannot be associated with pleasure or pain. On the other hand, the two agreeable sensations [rapture & bliss of the jhanas, apparently] form an obstacle to the application of the mind to any object, and anapanasati can only be realized by this application.’[139]

 

I can only conclude that the author of that view had neither meditated nor read the suttas. In all of these sections, one must admit the Kosa shows little direct reference to the suttas. But perhaps even odder is that whereas for the Nikayas/Agamas and Abhidhamma Pitakas of all schools anapanasati and body contemplation were part of satipatthana, here they are supposed to be just preliminaries.

 

‘We have spoken of the two teachings, the visualization of ugliness and anapanasati. Having attained samadhi by these two portals, now with a view to realizing insight…Having realized stilling, he will cultivate the satipatthanas.’[140]

 

Thus satipatthana is identified exclusively with insight developed on the basis of jhana. This satipatthana vipassana is supposed to proceed by seeing each of the four satipatthanas in terms of their ‘intrinsic nature’, and also in terms of their general characteristics as impermanent, etc. However the text dwells little on the intrinsic nature, merely defining the body as primary elements and derived materiality, and dhammas as everything that is not the other three; strangely, feelings and mind seem to be omitted. The focus is clearly on the general characteristics, and these are often talked of just in terms of dhammas.[141] Thus satipatthana in the Kosa seems to virtually ignore the basic exercises of the suttas and treat satipatthana entirely in terms of the vipassana aspects, which for the suttas were the contemplation of dhammas and the ‘development of satipatthana’. However this is at least partly a mere change in the expression, for this satipatthana vipassana is of course undertaken only after samadhi and so is not presented as ‘dry insight’.

 

If we search a little we can discern echoes of the earlier significance of satipatthana too. The four satipatthanas are said to be undertaken in sequence, for:

 

‘…one sees first that which is the coarsest. Or rather: the body is the support for sensual desire, which has its origin in the lust for feeling; this feeling occurs because the mind is not calmed, and the mind is not calmed because the defilements are not abandoned.’[142]

 

Or in the context of the spiritual faculties:

 

‘In order to obtain the result in which one has faith, one rouses energy. When striving there is the establishing of mindfulness. When mindfulness is set up one fixes the mind [in samadhi] in order to avoid distraction. When the mind is fixed there arises a consciousness that conforms to the object [panna].’[143]

 

And the next paragraph of the Kosa gives two alternative explanations of the progressive development of the 37 wings to enlightenment, both of which place the satipatthanas before samadhi.[144]

 

The exposition on the way of practice in the Kosa falls into confusion when it tries to treat various frameworks such as satipatthana and the other wings to enlightenment as distinct stages along the path, rather than as each offering complementary perspectives on the path as a whole. Yet we are able to discern significant threads of continuity with the early teachings. Of course the entire presentation is subsumed within the overriding emphasis on understanding that is a definitive pan-sectarian characteristic of the abhidhamma project. But I have not come across any vipassana take-over to the extent of sidelining jhana completely.

 

However, Richard Gombrich mentions that Harvarman’s Satyasiddhisastra[145] of the Bahusrutiya school uses the Susima Sutta to justify a path requiring a degree of concentration short of jhana. In this they agree with the Theravada commentaries; but their position is clearly unjustified by the Susima Sutta itself, in either the Theravada or Sarvastivada versions. The name of this school (‘The Very Learned’, or perhaps ‘The Followers of the Very Learned’) confirms the correlation between the move towards dry insight and the move out of the forest hermitages into the urban scholastic universities. Nevertheless, it appears that they did not base their conception of the path of dry insight on satipatthana. The Satyasiddhisastra analyzes the 37 wings to enlightenment as either samatha or vipassana. It describes the first three satipatthanas as samatha and the contemplation of dhammas as vipassana. Mindfulness in the faculties, powers, and enlightenment-factors is also treated under samatha. In this respect it would appear that this text is in agreement with the early suttas, the Theravada Abhidhamma and perhaps, in spirit if not in letter, with the Sarvastivada too.

 

Leon Hurvitz has published an interesting translation of some Agama sutras on satipatthana together with cognates from the Pali canon, and Chinese commentaries by Fa Sheng and others.[146] I am not quite sure of the actual relationship of the suttas and commentaries as presented by Hurvitz, for unlike the Pali commentaries the text merely gives a few suttas and then addends a miscellaneous discussion that has little to do with the particular suttas at hand. We have already described one of these suttas as the only sutta dealing with satipatthana as vipassana in the available Sarvastivada; here this is brought forward for emphasis. However, one of the commentators is careful to note that right knowledge is produced by samatha. The commentaries for the most part agree with the Kosa. Vipassana is a strong theme throughout, with a special emphasis on dependent origination, as well as abhidhamma-style analysis into ‘atoms’ and ‘moments’. Body contemplation exercises mentioned are anapanasati, ugliness, and elements. Initially one is to concentrate one’s mind on these internally only; according to one commentator only the perception of ugliness can be developed on the bodies of others. The other objects of satipatthana are not specified, except that dhammas again is perception and conceptual activities. Satipatthanas as objects is again discussed; the text claims that the Buddha said that ‘all dhammas’ refers to the four satipatthanas; since this statement is found neither in the existing Nikayas/Agamas nor is mentioned in the early controversies, it may be discounted. But the text rightly warns of the dangers in this approach:

 

‘…though it is all-inclusive, its fields of perception tend to get out of hand and a certain restriction is needed if the same goal, severance of the defilements, is to be achieved.’

 

Here the commentators, more explicitly than the other texts we have reviewed, treat the contemplation of dhammas as encompassing the other three:

 

‘Having entered into the dhammas, he takes a general look,

Beholding identically the marks of the dhammas:

“These four [objects of satipatthana] are impermanent,

Empty, not-self, suffering.” ’

 

 

The Mulasarvastivada were a late offshoot of the Sarvastivada (300-400CE?). Their main innovations seemed to have been literary rather than doctrinal. They composed many very long and elaborate sutras, biographies, and so on in the style made fashionable by the contemporary Mahayana sutras. Their Saddharmasmrityupasthana Sutra takes advantage of the expansive tendency of the subject of satipatthana. As well as offering much doctrinal and meditative material it includes various descriptions of heavens and hells and also includes references to the arts, painting, and theatre. Thus it popularizes the topic, placing satipatthana within the contemporary cultural movements of the day.

 

It will be fitting to conclude my survey with some details from the treatment of satipatthana in the main Indian schools of Mahayana, starting with the Yogacara. They were a meditative school whose distinctive philosophy is usually taken to be the assertion that ‘mind only’ exists, all else is illusion. This opens them up to the criticism that they are reverting to the Upanishadic position of postulating consciousness as the underlying ground of being, which is also equated with Nibbana; the Yogacarins themselves would seem to have various responses to such a critique. Stefan Anacker’s ‘The Meditational Therapy of the Madhyantavibhagabhasya’ offers a description and partial translation of what is, according to the translator, ‘one of the most striking works in the Mahayana literature’.[147] It is a commentary by Vasubandhu[148] on verses attributed to ‘Maitreyanatha’.

 

Following the Sarvastivadin precedent the text tries to rationalize the traditional order of the sets of wings to enlightenment as a progressive sequence (whereas for the suttas the order is not essential to the groups and simply organizes the sets according to numbers for the sake of convenience). There is an attempt to equate the four satipatthanas with the respective noble truths; this section has a refreshingly simple description of the contemplation of dhammas: a ‘lack of confusion as regards dhammas that serve to afflict and dhammas that serve to alleviate.’[149] Having accomplished this, one is supposed to undertake the four right efforts, and then develop samadhi through the four bases of psychic power. There is considerable discussion on various obstacles to meditation and antidotes; mindfulness is defined in agreement with the schools as ‘the lack of loss of the meditation object’.[150] Elsewhere the function of mindfulness is as antidote to ‘secondary afflictions’ because of ‘the absence of slackness and excitedness in mindfulness which is well-established in the objects of samatha, etc.’[151] Next, continuing the sets of the wings to enlightenment, arise the five spiritual faculties:

 

‘Having taken hold of faith, one undertakes energy, the result of this cause. Having undertaken energy, mindfulness occurs, and through mindfulness having occurred, the mind enters samadhi. When the mind is in samadhi, one knows as it is.’[152]

 

Here we are firmly in sutta territory. The difference between the spiritual faculties and spiritual powers is explained in terms of progressive stages of the path according to the Sarvastivada system; and then the enlightenment-factors and the noble eightfold path arise in due order.

 

Although the above treatment is basically similar to the Kosa, now the text asserts what it claims are three features distinguishing Mahayanist satipatthana:[153]

 

1)     The object of meditation for disciples is their own bodies, etc., while the bodhisattvas’ is both their own and others.

 

This is just wrong; as we have repeatedly seen, all strata of texts from the suttas onwards acknowledge both internal and external contemplation.

 

2)     Disciples contemplate the impermanence, etc., of the body, etc., while bodhisattvas use the method of non-apprehension [of bodies, etc.].

 

This refers to the fundamental philosophical division between the abhidhamma schools and the Mahayana: the abhidhammikas, especially the Sarvastivadins, tended to treat the dhammas as real substantial entities that possessed the characteristics of impermanence and so on. But the ‘Emptiness School’ (to which the author belonged) held that the dhammas, like a magical illusion, ‘do not exist as they appear, with the state of possessing grasped [objective] and grasper [subjective] aspects, but yet they do not not[154] exist, because of the existence of the illusion itself.’ This is the most important and complex philosophical dispute in later Indian Buddhism. Suffice to say here that, in my opinion, the abhidhammikas ventured significantly beyond the doctrines of the suttas in their reification of dhammas; but the ‘emptiness’ reaction, with some noble exceptions, did not distinguish between the doctrines of the suttas and the abhidhammikas, and hence tended to stigmatize all of the disciples as naïve realists. So this criticism, while it may have been pertinent in a certain context, does not apply to those simply following the suttas.

 

3)     Disciples cultivate satipatthana for the sake of non-attachment to their bodies, etc., while bodhisattvas practice neither for lack of attachment nor for nonlack of attachment, but for Nirvana which has no abode.

 

No doubt a similar point is being made here as when the text says that studying, reflecting on, and teaching the sutras of the Great Vehicle only is of great fruit, not of the Inferior Vehicle, since the Great Vehicle is distinguished because of its kindness to others.[155] It is the tedious old cliché about the selfishness of the disciples. Here I can do no better than to quote the words of the Master.

 

‘ “I will protect myself,” monks: thus should the satipatthanas be practiced. “I will protect others,” monks: thus should the satipatthanas be practiced. Protecting oneself, monks, one protects others; protecting others, one protects oneself.

 

‘And how is it, monks, that by protecting oneself one protects others? By the cultivation, development, and making much [of the four satipatthanas]. It is in such a way that protecting oneself one protects others.

 

‘And how is it, monks, that by protecting others one protects oneself? By patience, harmlessness, loving-kindness, and sympathy. It is in such a way that protecting others one protects oneself.’[156]

 

Santideva’s Siksasamuccaya, which I have quoted from briefly above, includes many powerful statements on satipatthana, in part collected from other Mahayanist works. Many of the passages are collected in Nyanaponika Thera’s widely available The Heart of Buddhist Meditation so there is no need to repeat them here in detail. Suffice to note the inclusion of sectarian material, continuing the trend of using the prestige of satipatthana to buttress one’s position in the energetic doctrinal debates that characterize much of written Buddhist history. The text quotes the Arya Ratnacuda Sutra, giving a characteristically Mahayanist slant on the internal/external contemplation of feelings.

 

‘When experiencing a pleasant feeling he conceives deep compassion for beings whose character is strongly inclined to lust, and he himself gives up the propensity to lust. When experiencing an unpleasant feeling he conceives deep compassion for beings whose character is strongly inclined towards hatred, and he himself gives up the propensity to hatred. When experiencing a neutral feeling he conceives deep compassion for beings whose character is strongly inclined to delusion, and he himself gives up the propensity to delusion.’

 

The contemplation of body includes a very powerful passage from the Dharmasangiti Sutra. This includes an attack on the Sarvastivada doctrine of time:

 

‘This body did not come from the past and will not go over to the future. It has no existence in the past or the future except in unreal and false conceptions.’

 

The other main Indian Mahayana school was the Madhyamika. Whereas the Yogacara were better known as a contemplative school, the Madhyamika were renowned for their witheringly sophisticated dialectic. However, they did not neglect meditation; the Bhavanakrama of Kamalasila seems to have been a meditation manual from the Madhyamika school of Santaraksita that was prepared for introducing meditation to the newly converted Tibetans.[157] The general path is described in the usual way as first mastering the scriptural and theoretical aspects, then developing samadhi culminating in jhana and formless attainments before undertaking vipassana. As in the Yogacara account it is acknowledged that only on the vipassana level is there any significant divergence from the early schools. What is truly remarkable is that the course of vipassana seems to be derived from the doctrinal evolution of the schools through history. That is to say, one is to meditate successively seeing ultimate reality as it is presented by each of the main schools, then to realize that this level of reality is in fact empty, and then to pass to higher, more subtle perspectives, culminating, of course, in the ultimate emptiness of the Madhyamika. Thus one’s individual consciousness quite explicitly evolves in reflection of the collective consciousness. Even more remarkable, these stages of historical evolution as presented here clearly parallel the four satipatthanas, even though (so far as the sources available to me reveal) the satipatthanas are not explicitly invoked. Here I will quote from Kajiyama’s summary.

 

‘In the foregoing sections taken from Kamalasila’s Bhavanakrama 1, four stages are plainly distinguishable:

 

1)     The preliminary stage in which external realities admitted in the systems of the Sarvastivada and Sautrantika are presented as the object of criticism;

2)     The stage in which only the mind with manifested images is admitted – the system of the Satyakaravada-yogacara school forms the object of meditation;

3)     The meditation stage in which the objects of cognition as well as the duality of subject and object are condemned as unreal and in which the knowledge without duality is proclaimed to be real – this being the standpoint of the Alikakaravada-yogacarin.

4)     The stage in which even the non-dual knowledge or the pure illumination of cognition is declared to be empty of an intrinsic nature. This latter stage is the highest one proclaimed by the Madhyamika.’

 

Thus the first stage sees the dhammas as substantial entities, paralleling the contemplation of the body. The second stage admits the ‘features’ or objects of the mind, paralleling the contemplation of feelings, which are the most prominent properties of the mind. The third stage only admits cognition itself, corresponding to the contemplation of the mind. And the last sees only pure emptiness, which is defined as ‘dependent origination’, just as the contemplation of dhammas focuses not on seeing the phenomena in and of themselves, but as a matrix of conditions. Please note that I am not trying to identify these things or deny their differences, but merely to indicate certain relationships. I think the parallelism is both undeniable and significant. I would understand that the original sequence of the four satipatthanas embodies a natural progression, from coarse to fine, that can be discerned in experience. Like so many other Buddhist teachings it is a simple but extremely subtle paradigm that is reflected in any number of manifestations. As such, for those steeped in the teachings there is a tendency, whether conscious or not, to assimilate the principles, abstract them, and apply them in contexts quite removed from the original – as indeed I am doing here. This has its use in discerning continuities and relationships, but it demands a corresponding re-assertion of the original context if we are not to be cut adrift from our mooring. As we have been warned above, ‘its fields of perception tend to get out of hand and a certain restriction is needed if the same goal, severance of the defilements, is to be achieved’.

 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

The overall trend in the evolution of satipatthana is clear, and seems to be a pan-sectarian movement: mainly samatha in the early suttas; a mixture of samatha and vipassana in the late suttas and Abhidhamma; and mainly vipassana in the later period. The main difference between the Theravada and Sarvastivada is in the changeover period. The Sarvastivada moves in a more straightforward way from samatha in the suttas towards vipassana in the Dharmaskandha, whereas for the Theravada the equivalent Vibhanga emphasizes samatha more than the Satipatthana Sutta

 

This difference reflects the orientation of these emerging schools. The Theravadins, with their vipassana emphasis, were more humanistic, rational, scholastic, urban. The Sarvastivadins were more faith-orientated, emphasizing ‘skilful means’, the unpredictable charisma of the forest sage. Even in the modern Theravada this distinction is recognizable, with the forest monks devoting themselves to samadhi, while their brothers in the city monasteries do dry vipassana. But it is almost inevitable that the rugged earnestness of the forest tradition will become tamed and civilized, and will turn away from practice towards study. Sometimes this only takes a generation or two. And so the later Sarvastivadins went on to develop a vast Abhidhamma literature, in which satipatthana became just vipassana.

 

The differences between the Theravadin and Sarvastivadin Satipatthana Suttas reflect the fundamental schismatic issue that divided these schools – time. The Theravada upheld a radical version of the theory of momentariness, holding that each dhamma arises and passes away in an instant, leaving no remainder in the following instant. The Sarvastivadins accepted a version of the theory of moments, but they also held the tenet, from which they derived their name, that ‘all dhammas – past, present, and future – exist’. The present moment was seen as the manifest or effective mode of phenomena. Thus impermanence is marginalized; ultimate reality is becoming changeless. We have seen hints of this perspective emerging in their Smrityupasthana Sutra and Dharmaskandha; the Kosa applies the fully-fledged Sarvastivadin metaphysic of time to satipatthana.[158]

 

The origins of this obscure dogma should, I believe, be sought in the emotional response of the Buddhist community to the acute sense of pain and loss with the passing of the Buddha. The Sarvastivadins keenly felt that they lived in a diminished age, that the glory days of the sasana were inexorably passing. As an emotional rather than intellectual issue it is articulated on the mythic and symbolic level. Their patriarch Upagupta’s role was to halt the passage of time by sustaining the sasana. The key myth had him winning a battle with Mara and, as his privilege of victory, imploring the newly converted God of Death to re-create the image of the Buddha so that Upagupta could gaze upon the that glorious visage now so sadly passed. Mara agreed on one condition: that when he changed his shape into the Buddha, Upagupta was not, under any circumstances, to bow to him. After all, he’s still Mara. Upagupta agreed; but when he beheld the splendor of the Buddha’s form created by Mara he could not help himself – overwhelmed with rapture he fell to the ground and prostrated himself before Mara.

 

These attitudes towards time are reflected in the respective recensions of the Satipatthana Sutta, and to a lesser degree the Samyutta, with the Sarvastivadins shying away from the contemplation of impermanence, while the Theravadins made it the backbone of their system. Vipassana sees discontinuity in time, samatha sees continuity. This suggests that the schismatic differences were not all theory. Even today, differences in meditation techniques, divided precisely along the lines of samatha versus vipassana, are, incredibly enough, among the most divisive issues in Buddhism. We invest a lot in our meditation, a lot of time, a lot of effort, a lot of pain; and so we attach, sometimes much more deeply than to mere theory. It seems not at all implausible that in the past, as today, differences in approach and emphasis to meditation can harden into defensiveness as to who’s got the right ‘system’; and it would seem inevitable that the interpretation of doctrine would be shaped to suit. Doctrinal interpretations would tend to reify, with a growing insistence on the primacy of one’s own take on ‘ultimate reality’. This being so, it would seem that an approach to meditation that emphasized the essential harmony and complementariness of samatha and vipassana would be a healing force in the sasana. This would allow us to appreciate the benefits of the various approaches to meditation without insisting on any one of them as absolute and sufficient for everyone. In this we would be following in the tolerant footsteps of the Buddha, accepting whatever spiritual practices are good and in line with the dhamma, while avoiding the dogmatic extremes of metaphysics.

---

NOTE: In this work DN (etc.) = Digha Nikaya (etc.) and DA (etc.) = Dirgha Agama (etc.) 

[1] Inward Path Publishers. The present work can be seen as a sort of inflated footnote to A Swift Pair of Messengers. In fact I originally thought of incorporating the results of this research in that book. However I decided against this because of the difference in method and approach the current project demanded, and also because at the time my research was still unfolding. I still may go back and revise the earlier work to accord with the later; this would require considerable re-organizing, but little change in substance.

[2] Richard Gombrich, How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of Early Buddhism, Synergy Books International.

[3] A.K. Warder, Indian Buddhism, Motilal Barnasidass, 3^rd revised edition 2000, pg. 86 footnote.

[4] Dhamma Dana Publications 1996

[5] Motilal Barnasidass

[6] Oneworld Publications, 2001

[7] L. Schmithausen, ‘Die vier Konzentration der Aufmerksamkeit’, Zeitschrift fur Missionwissenschaft und Religionwissenschaft, 60 (1976), pp. 241-66; J. Bronkhorst, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 48 (1985) pp. 309-12.

[8] AN 5.193, SN 46.55

[9] CU 1.12,cp. AN 5.191

[10] BAU 6.4.9

[11] BAU 1.5.17

[12] BAU 3.7.23

[13] BAU 4.4.23

[14] SU 1.14

[15] SU 2.8 Cp. Sn 1034f

[16] SU 2.9

[17] SU 2.11

[18] E.g. MN 36.17ff

[19] E.g. BAU 5.12

[20] CU 1.19

[21] MN 26/MA 204

[22] SN 35.103

[23] The Sarvastivadin version (MA 204) mentions only faith, energy, and wisdom here, but includes mindfulness just below.

[24] E.g. SN 48.9

[25] AN 4.123

[26] AN 4.125

[27] Sn 1026

[28] Sn 1009

[29] Sn 1107

[30] Sn 1070, Sn 1113ff. Interestingly, the sphere of nothingness is described in Sn 1070 as a ‘support’ (arammana) for crossing over. This rare positive use of ‘support’ may be compared with the Mahabharata passage quoted above that describes the unconcentrated mind as ‘without support’. The Jhana Samyutta also speaks of the development of ‘skill in the support’.

[31] SN 46.52, SN 46.53

[32] SN 46.54

[33] E.g. MN 83/MA 67/EA pp 806c-810b Makhadeva; DN 19 Mahagovinda also includes the divine abidings, but they are absent from DA 3, T 8 p207c-210b, and Mv 3.197-224

[34] SN Sagathavagga verse 269, AN (4)449-51. This phrase was somewhat misleadingly rendered by Bhikkhu Bodhi as ‘discovered jhana’.

[35] SN 35.132

[36] MBh 12.188.9

[37] MBh 12.188.15. Bronkhorst notes that here, as well as in the Yoga Sutra and in some Buddhist works, vitakka and vicara ‘are apparently looked upon as special faculties in the first dhyana, not as mere thought remaining from ordinary consciousness’. Bronkhurst pg. 71.

[38] MBh 12.188.22

[39] YS 1.17

[40] DN 1/DA 19

[41] YS 1.18

[42] YS 1.20

[43] SN 14.11

[44] MN 36.20, etc.

[45] MN?????

[46] MN??????

[47] CU 6.7

[48] Sukkajjhana. Could this be related to the commentarial notion of ‘dry insight’?

[49] Uttarajjhayana 29.72/1174

[50] E.g. Thananga Sutta. See Bronkhorst pg. 38ff

[51] SN 45.1

[52] MA 144=MN 107 Ganakamoggallana Sutta

[53] MN 125/MA 198

[54] SN 48.9, etc.

[55] MA 189, etc.

[56] T vol.2, 90, 24.610 (2.171B), entry 6.

[57] AN 6.117ff

[58] AN 8.63

[59] AN 6.29

[60] Cp MN 32/MA 184, MN 123/MA 78

[61] AN 5.122

[62] SN 47.4

[63] SN 47.8

[64] SN 47.10

[65] SN 47.15, 47.16, 47.21, 47.46, 47.47

[66] SN 47.5

[67] SN 47.6, 7

[68] SN 47.1

[69] BAU 2.4.11; 4.5.12

[70] CU 7.5.2

[71] Sn 1136

[72] SN 47.3

[73] DN 18.26

[74] SN 47.12

[75] SN 47.2

[76] SN 47.35

[77] SN 47.40

[78] I might note here that when chanting this passage I have long noticed that certain of the phrases are awkward on the tongue. In particular the long compound samudayavayadhammanupassi (‘contemplating the arising and vanishing nature’) starts with a long sequence of six short syllables, which is very unusual in the early colloquial language, and much more suggestive of late scholastic Pali. The early idiom udayabbaya avoids the problem.

[79] SN 47.42

[80] E.g. MN 138/MA 164 Uddesavibhanga

[81] SN 52.1/T. 2.139a

[82] SN 36.7, 36.8

[83] SN 36.11, 36.15-20

[84] SN 36.2, 36.7-10, 36.22

[85] SN 22.80

[86] MN 78/MA 179 Samanamandika

[87] SN 35.132, etc.

[88] SN 35.134

[89] SN 48.2-7

[90] MN 119/MA 81

[91] Paccavekkhana nimitta. The Chinese Madhyama Agama and the Pali Majjhima Nikaya has ‘contemplating image’, suggesting that the Chinese translation was influenced by the later meaning of nimitta.

[92] Gethin follows Warder’s error here in stating that the Chinese version omits the sense media. It does not.

[93] Of course the agamas were completed before the advent of the Mahayana school as such. When I speak of ‘Mahayana-style’ ideas I am usually referring to kinds of ideas that later became identified with the Mahayana. Many of these ideas, however, were current before the Mahayana. It seems that the most distinctive trait of the early Mahayana was not their philosophy but their stress on practicing the way of the Bodhisattva for the realization of Buddhahood.

[94] 24 in number. Sarvastivada has 29, while Theravada has 31

[95] This phrase comes in just where we have noted some confusion between the Theravada’s ‘for a measure of knowledge, measure of mindfulness’ and Sarvastivada’s ‘obtains knowledge, vision, realization, understanding’. Could we have an original pattiya changing in one direction to mattaya and in the other direction something like pattya>paccya>paccaya?

[96] MN 119/MA 81

[97] MN 141

[98] MA 31

[99] SN 18, SN 25, SN 26, SN 27

[100] AN 7.80ff

[101] MN 111

[102]  To facilitate easy comparison, where the parallels with the Pali are close and obvious I have substituted my own preferred renderings of technical terms for those given in CMA & PMN. Here and elsewhere the Chinese regularly has ‘right knowledge’, evidently reading samma nana instead of the Pali sampajanna.

[103]  Chinese has ‘the ear-sphere’.

[104]  Chinese has ‘receiving and hearing the dhamma’.

[105]  Chinese has ‘consideration of patience’, evidently a mistranslation of nijjhanakkhanti. Khanti in this sense seems to be misunderstood throughout the Chinese tradition, leading to a distinct shift in meaning in many passages.

[106]  Probably yoniso manasikara, ‘paying attention to the root’.

[107]  Probably a confusion stemming from the idiom kayena phusati, ‘one personally contacts’.

[108] Chinese has ‘think of its characteristic’, evidently from nimittam manasikaroti.

[109] Kasinayatana. PED says the derivation of kasina is unknown, but the Chinese rendering points to the Sanskrit cognate krtsna, ‘whole, entire’. The Jatakas use kasina in this sense, and the standard sutta description of kasina is ‘above, below, across, non-dual, measureless’.  All this shows that kasina in the suttas does not mean ‘external device for meditation’, but is rather a term for the meditation attainment itself. This is also in conformity with the Abhidhamma usage. This suggests that the mysterious ‘space kasina’ and ‘cognition kasina’ are just alternative labels for the sphere of infinite space and the sphere of infinite cognition.

[110] Vibhanga pg. 374

[111] Vibhanga pg. 411ff

[112] E.g. Dhs 597, 636, 642-646, 1115, 1366

[113] Here we see the move towards elevating kasinas from obscurity in the suttas to primacy in the Visuddhimagga. See above note????

[114] We have already encountered above a sutta passage where the signless concentration is clearly distinguished as different from satipatthana (SN 22.80), although it is not clear whether these things have the same meaning in the Abhidhamma; the treatment of these meditations in the suttas is somewhat obscure and variable.

[115] Mula Tika Be (1960) to Vibh-A 287; quoted at Gethin pg. 323

[116] Vsm 22.40

[117] PP 4.187

[118] AN 4.94

[119] AN 4.170

[120] PP 4.177ff

[121] See Vsm 20.120

[122] SN 47.40

[123] SN 52.2, and to some extent MES

[124] The sutta and commentary, together with extracts from the sub-commentary, have been published in translation by Soma Thera under the title The Way of Mindfulness (BPS and other editions). The following page references are to the 1999 edition reprinted by WAVE for BPS.

[125] Pg. 30

[126] Pg. 40

[127] Pg. 54

[128] Pg. 97

[129] Pg. 39

[130] Pg. 165

[131] Pg. 166

[132] Asokarajavadana 1206 [Prz363-364]

[133] Asokarajavadana pg. 3 [Strong 1983b:174; Przyluski 1923a:363]

[134] Kosa 6.68 Following references to Abhidharmakosabhasyam, trans. Louis de La Vallee Poussin and Leo M. Pruden, Asian Humanities Press 1988.

[135] Kosa 6.9

[136] Kosa 6.11

[137] Kosa 6.12

[138] Kosa 8.1

[139] Kosa 6.12

[140] Kosa 6.13-14

[141] Kosa 6.14, 15b, 16, etc.

[142] Kosa 6.15; cp. 6.2

[143] Kosa 6.69

[144] Kosa 6.70

[145] N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Oriental Institute, Baroda, vol. 1 1975, vol. 2 1978

[146] Leon Hurvitz, ‘Fa Sheng’s Observations’ in Mahayana Buddhist Meditation, Minoru Kiyota (ed.), University Press of Hawaii, 1978; Motilal Barnasidass, 1991.

[147] Mahayana Buddhist Meditation. Following numbers usually refer to the commentary on the numbered verses.

[148] I do not wish to enter on the discussion of the ‘two Vasubandhus’; suffice to note that Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakosa is from the Sravakayana (Sarvastivada/Sautrantika) perspective, while the Madhyantavibhagabhasya is Mahayana (Yogacara).

[149] MVB 4.1

[150] MVB 4.5

[151] MVB 4.11

[152] MVB 4.7

[153] MVB 4.13

[154] Translation omits the second ‘not’, but this is presumably an error; see introduction pg. 92

[155] MVB 5.9, 10

[156] SN 47.19

[157] See Yuichi Kajiyama, ‘Later Madhyamikas’, Mahayana Buddhist Meditation.

[158] Kosa 6.19